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ARTICLES

Imagining the Homeland from
Afar: Community and Peoplehood
in the Age of the Diaspora
Adeno Addis*

ABSTRACT

Diasporas-understood as groups of individuals or
communities who carry an image of a homeland that is separate
from the host land in which they reside-have always been with
us. As long as there have been large movements of people across
boundaries, be it voluntary or involuntary, there have been
diasporas. The image of the homeland that diasporas carry
could be real (an existing country) or imagined (a future
country). In whatever way diasporas imagine the homeland,
they have often attempted to act as if they belong to "we the
people" of the homeland. They imagine themselves to be "outside
the state but inside the people." Homeland governments have
often welcomed (or encouraged) diasporas' interventions in
homeland affairs, but not always. Whether diasporasare indeed
"inside the people" although "outside the state" becomes an issue
both when the interests of diasporas and governments of the
homelands converge and when they diverge. This Article
explores how and for what purpose diasporas could be
considered to be part of the people of the homeland and when
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Law School. For helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article, I am thankful to
Onnig Dombalagian, Jonathan Nash, Michael Vitiello, Keith Werhan, and Siegfried
Wiessner. A version of this paper was presented as a lecture at the Rapoport Center for
Human Rights and Justice at the University of Texas School of Law. I am thankful to
Professor Karen Engle, director of the center, for inviting me to give the lecture and for
Professor Barbara Harlow for her instructive response to the lecture and to the paper
generally. I also thank attendees of the lecture for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
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not. This requires a theory of "peoplehood" that this Article
develops and defends. Using the notion of "community of
stakeholders," the Article indicates when and how those who are
outside the state and yet consider themselves to be inside the
people can participate in the life of the homeland. The Article
also advances and defends the claim that the relationship
between diasporas and homelands enables bridging the claims
of cosmopolitans and unreconstructed territorialists, for the
version of community that is worked out of the relationship
between diasporasand homelands mediates the two aspects of
people's existence in this globalized world-nationalattachment
and cosmopolitan sentiment.
The
homeland-diaspora
relationship offers a point of departure for understandinghow
communities are formed and transformed; how legal obligations
and allegiances develop and are altered; and generally, how a
people constitutes itself both within and across territorial
boundaries.1
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I. INTRODUCTION

A number of countries have set up departments, either within
their foreign ministries 2 or as independent cabinet-level offices, 3 with
the task of defining and managing the relationship between the
homeland and its diaspora. 4 This trend is likely to grow, and at a
faster speed. A number of facts inform the increasing interest shown
by states and their governments in their diasporas. First, because of
globalization and the increasing ease with which people circulate
across national boundaries, there are many more citizens and former
citizens of states living outside the homeland. The sheer size of the
diaspora has caused many states to take note and to develop an
interest in their citizens or former citizens residing abroad.
Second, and even more importantly, the communication
revolution has made it easier for those citizens or former citizens to
maintain interest in and contact with their former homeland. This
interest from the diaspora triggers a corresponding interest from the

2.
For example, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Romania, and Uruguay
have diaspora or expatriate affairs departments within their foreign affairs ministries.
See CLOSING THE DISTANCE: How GOVERNMENTS STRENGTHEN TIES WITH THEIR
DIASPORAS 7 (Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias ed., 2009), cited in Migration Policy Inst.,
Taxonomy of the Diaspora-Engaging Institutions in 30 Developing Countries,
MIGRATIONINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/migrationdevelopment/taxonomy.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
3.
See, e.g., id. (Armenia (Ministry of Diaspora), Bangladesh (Ministry of
Expatriates' Welfare), Georgia (State Ministry for Diaspora Issues), India (Ministry of
Overseas Indian Affairs), Serbia (Ministry of Diaspora), Yemen (Ministry of Expatriate
Affairs)). Other countries have other national institutions whose task is to deal with
diaspora affairs. Id. at 9. Thus, China has a state council for overseas Chinese affairs.
See id.
4.
For a fascinating account of the role of the Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs, see Anupam Chander, Homeward Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 77 (2006). See
also THE INDIAN DIASPORA, http://indiandiaspora.nic.in (last visited Sept. 22, 2012)
(promulgating information to and in support of the Indian diaspora); MINISTRY OF
OVERSEAS INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://moia.gov.inl (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (seeking to
unite the Indian diaspora with its motherland). The Ethiopian office of expatriate
affairs was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002 and is called the
General Directorate in charge of Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs (GDEEA). A blurb from
the Foreign Ministry says this: "Recognizing the roles of the Ethiopian Diaspora with
respect to their country of origin, the Government of Ethiopia has through its Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, created the General Directorate in charge of Ethiopian Expatriate
Affairs in January 2002." Community Services, EMBASSY OF ETHIOPIA,
http:/www.ethiopianembassy.org/Community/Community.php
(last visited Oct. 5,
2012); see also Aaron Matteo Terrazas, Country Profiles: Beyond Regional Circularity:
The Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora, MIGRATIONINFORMATION.ORG (June 2007),
http://www.migrationinformation.orgProfiles/display.cfm?ID=604 (discussing how the
General Directorate in Charge of Expatriate Affairs was created to "(1) serve as a
liaison between the government and the diaspora; (2) encourage the active involvement
of the diaspora in socioeconomic activities in Ethiopia; (3) safeguard the rights and
privileges of Ethiopians abroad; (4) mobilize the diaspora to improve the public image
of Ethiopia"). For a description of the missions of the diaspora affairs of the various
countries, see generally Migration Policy Inst., supranote 2.
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homeland-whether to reinforce or preserve cultural identity,
facilitate repatriation, or tap the economic potential of the diaspora.
Third, in relation to many countries, especially developing countries,
their diasporas, often residing in developed western countries, have
considerable financial and political clout. Home governments seek to
define and manage the relationship between the diaspora and
homeland in a manner intended to minimize the possibility of
organized challenge to the regime in power from, or with the help of,
the diaspora, while at the same time enhancing the vital financial
contribution of the diaspora to the economies of those countries. The
strategy may include positive incentives, as well as political
5
intimidation of vocal opponents residing abroad.
But this mutual interest among diasporas and homelands has
raised a number of significant issues about membership and
belonging. What precisely is the nature of diasporic membership that
is desired or cultivated, and how does it fit in with (or undermine) the
idea of belonging that has been a hallmark of the state system-the
primary defining feature of which is citizenship? Does the diasporahomeland relationship open up new forms of community and
peoplehood worth cultivating, or does it undermine the possibility of
developing any community of character and depth?
Processes of globalization, especially the impact of new
communication technologies and the large movement of people across
national boundaries, have required rethinking a number of concepts
that have played a central role in political and legal thought for a
considerable length of time-concepts such as community, the nature
and sources of legal and political rights and obligations, the sources of
jurisdictional and enforcement authority, and the like. In the age of
cyber-communication, when one can instantaneously link to and
commune with others across territorial boundaries, should the notion
of physical space (geography) continue to be seen as central to the
formation and cultivation of political communities? To the extent that
political communities are to be sources of legal and political
obligations, what counts as the relevant community in this globalized
cyber-world?
The frame of reference for these questions has been either the
international community (cosmopolitanism) or national territorial
communities (nationalism). For cosmopolitans, the international
community provides the point of reference and a source of allegiance

5.
relation

See, for.example, a policy paper the Ethiopian government circulated in
to

its

diaspora.

MINISTRY

OF

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

OF

ETHIOPIA,

http://www.mfa.gov.et/Ethiopians-OriginAbroad/Ethiopia-Origin.php
(last visited
Jan. 29, 2011). For the Amharic (Ethiopian national language) version of the document,
see ETHIOMEDIA.COM, http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/document.pdf (last visited
Sept. 22, 2012).
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and obligation. Cosmopolitans view the obligation to humankind as
one's highest obligation. 6 Thus, for example, the push for universal
jurisdiction of certain crimes is premised on the proposition that
those crimes injure all members of the international community, not
simply the immediate victims who happen to be citizens of this or
that country or within the jurisdiction of this or that nation.7 For the
nationalists, allegiances are owed to the people who are comembers of
political communities, almost always constituted as territorial
states.8 Thus, for the nationalist, universal jurisdiction is inconsistent
with the notion of a world of territorial communities. The nation-state
is the highest point of legal and political obligation. 9 International
legal theorizing has essentially mapped the two poles, although
nationalists still dominate the field.
This Article argues that the diaspora-homeland relationship
offers another point of departure for understanding how communities
are formed and transformed, how legal obligation and allegiances
develop and are altered, and generally, how a people constitutes itself
both within and across territorial borders. Indeed, the relationship
between diasporas and homelands may suggest how to bridge
between the claims of cosmopolitans (that all humans are members
and citizens of one human community) and the territorialist approach
of nationalists (the state is the most relevant actor in the
international realm).
Diasporas are "outside the state but inside the people."'10 Thus,
the diaspora-homeland relationship affirms part of the cosmopolitan
intuition that the territorial state is no longer, if ever, the only
relevant source of peoplehood. But the relationship also counsels that
meaningful allegiances and obligations will have to be worked out in
the context of narratives of specific history of common sympathy and
origin.
This Article is organized in a manner that facilitates a
systematic and orderly inquiry into the issues raised in Part I-the
relationship between diasporas and homelands, and what that
relationship suggests about the nature of communities and
peoplehood in the era of globalization and the communication

See David Held, Principles of Cosmopolitanism, in THE POLITICAL
6.
PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOPOLITANISM 10, 12 (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005)
("[Tihe ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings, not states or
other particular forms of human association.").
7.
See Adeno Addis, Imagining the InternationalCommunity: The Constitutive
Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction,31 HLM. RTS. Q. 129, 142-44 (2009) (arguing that
certain crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction because they violate "fundamental
norms" that create "obligations ...that extend to all people").
8.
See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
9.
See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
10.

YOSSI SHAIN, KINSHIP AND DIAsPoRAs IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 124

(2007) (emphasis omitted).
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revolution. Part II explores the general issue of membership in a
community. The distinctiveness of communities and peoples depends
on some form of closure and on their ability to control and distribute
the social good of membership. It briefly explores how membership is
or should be allocated. Part II also makes a preliminary observation
as to what that mode of allocation would mean for the diasporahomeland relationships.
Part III explores in some detail the nature of peoplehood-the
various understandings of what it means to be a people. "We the
people" is a phrase that serves as the opening words of two of the
most famous constitutive documents currently in force-the U.S.
Constitution and the UN Charter. This Part examines the multiple
understandings of what it means to be a people so as to prepare the
ground for an assessment of what version of peoplehood describes
more fully and accurately the relationships and connections between
diasporas and homelands. Part IV then gives a short account of how
diasporas can be seen as part of we the people of the homeland and,
yet, do not comfortably fit the two reigning notions of peoplehood
described in Part III: national (political) peoplehood and ethnocultural peoplehood. Diasporas, on the one hand, exemplify the
transitional movement-the paradigmatic "Other" of the nationstate-while paradoxically also assuming the nation-state for their
very existence and coherence. The Part then argues that there is a
need for a new theory of peoplehood that is capable of capturing this
paradox.
Part V explores the struggles and contests between diasporas
and homeland governments to define who is a member of "the people"
of the homeland. While governments often see diasporas as the Other
of the nation-state, diasporas see themselves as inside the people,
though outside the territory. Although the relationship between
diasporas and homelands has been by and large outside the concern
of traditional international law, there was a period (the interwar
period) when international law briefly turned its attention to that
relationship. This Part turns to that era to see what it teaches about
the relationship between modern-day diasporas and homelands.
Part VI develops a theory of peoplehood based on the notion of a
community of stakeholders. The idea of stakeholders, this Article
argues, gives a descriptively and normatively defensible evaluation of
the relationship between modern diasporas and homelands. The Part
then puzzles through the institutional implications of the notion of
peoplehood
developed
and
defended
therein.
Institutional
arrangements are evaluated from two angles: their openness to allow
all stakeholders (including those that reside in a host state) to
participatein the life of the community, and their capacity to provide
protection to all stakeholders (including those outside the territorial
limit of the homeland) when they are in need of such protection. As
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an example of the latter, the value of what this Article calls "diasporic
jurisdiction" is explored. Finally, the Part briefly examines the role of
diasporas in constitutional settlement in severely fractured societies.
The battle in these societies is often nothing less than how to define
and redefine the people. And the role of the diaspora in that process
has been crucial, for good or for ill.
Part VII concludes by noting that the version of community that
can be worked out of the relationship between diasporas and
homelands can act as a bridge between two aspects of people's
existence in this globalized world-national attachment and
cosmopolitan sentiment.

II. THE ISSUE OF MEMBERSHIP: PRELIMINARY COMMENT
Membership in a political community, or any other community
is, as Michael Walzer argues, "a social good."'1 By "social good,"
Walzer simply means that the good has "shared meanings" because
its "conception and creation are social processes. '12 Its meaning is
understood within groups and its value is fixed "by our work and
conversation."'1 3 And like any other social good, membership is
distributed and may be the concern of distributive justice. 14 The
distinctiveness of communities depends on some form of closure and
the members' ability to have a say in how this social good-one that
may be considered to be a primary social good1 5-is distributed to

11.
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 32 (1983). Walzer suggests that perhaps there are no other kinds of goods
(other than social goods), although he meant to leave the question open. Id. at 7.
12.
Id. at 7.
13.
Id. at 32.
14.
See id. at 7 ("All the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are
social goods."); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS,
AND CITIZENS 3 (2004) (arguing that "a cosmopolitan theory of justice cannot be
restricted to schemes of just distribution on a global scale, but must also incorporate a
vision of just membership"). Walzer also famously argued that given that social goods
are understood by the meaning of the goods in question, goods should be distributed in
"autonomous" fashion, within the particular "sphere of justice." WALZER, supra note 11,
at 10, 42-94.
15.
I say "primary" because in many cases membership determines whether
one is entitled to a share of other social goods and whether he would have a say in how
those goods shall be allocated. It is, to paraphrase Hannah Arendt, a good that paves
the way to have the right to other goods:
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice ... is at stake
when belonging to a community [is denied a human being] .... We become
aware of the existence of a right to have rights... and a right to belong to some
kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost
and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.
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potential or would-be members. Generally, membership in political
communities has been premised on the existence of geography that
can be closed off. 16 In terms of the nation-state, the link between land
and people has been taken to be a crucial feature of community and
identity. 17 Indeed, the social good of membership is so linked to
territory and the nation-state that people "consider it a great
' 8
misfortune to be 'stateless."
How membership in national political communities should be
allocated has been a subject of intense debate and scholarly
investigation.' 9 But the discussion has often been limited to the
relationship between a host country and its immigrant residents

BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 51 (emphasis added by Benhabib) (quoting HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM: IMPERIALISM 177 (1968); see also WALZER,
supra note 11, at 31 ('The primary good that we distribute to one another is
membership in some human community.").
See WALZER, supra note 11, at 39 ("The distinctiveness of cultures and
16.
groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of
human life."); see also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 38-39 (1999) (arguing that
boundaries are necessary even if they seem arbitrary, and that a government, as the
people's agent and representative, should be responsible for the people's territory,
environmental integrity, and population size); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4041(1993) (noting that a society is a completely closed social system).
. 17.
See WALZER, supra note 11, at 44 ("Nations look for countries because in
some deep sense they already have countries: the link between people and land is a
crucial feature of national identity."). See generally GEOGRAPHY AND LAW: LANDSCAPE,
IDENTITY AND REGULATION (William Taylor ed., 2006) (presenting a collection of essays
that "relate notions of space and representations of landscape to concerns for individual
identity and autonomy").
18.
Stephen Macedo, The Law of Peoples: What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to
One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law of Peoples, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1721, 1730 (2004). Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seems to
endorse the importance of not being stateless when it proclaims that "everyone has a
right to a nationality." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A,
U.N. Doc. AJRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
19.
See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 11, at 31-63 (arguing that a theory of justice
must account for both the right of closure and "the political inclusiveness of the
existing communities"); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETWEEN PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICS: THE DIRECTION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP POLICY 49-64 (1998) (discussing
different models of membership and trends in how membership is determined);
BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 213-21 (arguing that the notion that democratic selfgovernance requires closure to establish accountability to a specific people can be
reconciled with cosmopolitanism about membership); Arash Abizadeh, Democratic
Theory and Border Coercion: No Right To Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders, 36
POL. THEORY 37, 37-38 (2008) (arguing that acceptance of democratic theory of
political legitimation commits one "to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control
and close the state's boundaries" with respect to both membership and movement). See
generally OWEN M. FISS, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF NEW AMERICANS (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (collecting essays by Fiss
and others on how membership should be allocated); PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M.
SMITH, CITIZENS WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 116-40

(1985) (arguing that a consensual principle of political membership is both more
legitimate and more practical). International law has, of course, left the issue to the
discretion of states.
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(noncitizen permanent or temporary residents, or undocumented
aliens 20 ) or would-be immigrants (those seeking to enter into that
territorial community). 2 1 In relation to the first, the issue has often
been whether citizenship should be required for full membership in a
political community. What does a theory of just political membership
suggest as to what a state ought to allow noncitizen residents to
participate in? That is, what sorts of membership are implied by
theories of justice (just membership) and democracy (democratic
sovereignty)? While some commentators have argued that citizenship
is the basis of full membership and that the territorial community
22
decides the conditions under which full membership is granted,
others have claimed that what is consistent with a theory of

The current public debate about immigration in the United States revolves
20.
around the issue of undocumented aliens, whose number is not exactly known but is
estimated to be around 11 million:
In the first half of the decade, an average of 850,000 people a year
entered the United States without authorization, according to the report,
released Wednesday. As the economy plunged into recession between 2007 and
2009, that number fell to 300,000. The drop has contributed to an 8 percent
decrease in the estimated number of illegal immigrants living in the United
States, from a peak of 12 million in 2007 to 11.1 million in 2009, the report
said. Of the 11.1 million, 60 percent came from Mexico, 20 percent from other
parts of Latin America, 11 percent from Asia, and 8 percent from Africa,
Europe, Canada and elsewhere.
Tara Bahrampour, Number of Illegal Immigrants in U.S. Drops, Report Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/contentlarticle/2010/09/
01/AR2010090106940.html.
21.
See Seyla Benhabib, The Law of Peoples, Distributive Justice, and
Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1762 (2004) ("By political membership, I mean
the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and
newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities."); see also Abizadeh,
supra note 19, at 44 ("My thesis is that, according to democratic theory, the democratic
justification for a regime of border control is ultimately owed to both members and
nonmembers.").
22.
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 19 (arguing that determinations of
citizenship should be left to public choice); see also Rainer Baubock, Stakeholder
Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation:A Normative Evaluation of
External Voting, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2393 (2007) ("[Pjolitical participation and
representation rights are the core of republican conceptions of citizenship."). The
Supreme Court of the United States has, on many occasions, expressed the view that
citizenship is the core of full membership. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268
(1967) ("Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the
country and the country is its citizenry."). For example, the court in Cabell v. ChavezSalido stated:
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a
deficiency but a necessary consequence of a community's process of political
self-definition. Self-government, whether direct or through representatives,
begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the
governors as well: Aliens are by definition outside this community.
454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982).
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democracy and justice is not citizenship, but "the principle that those
who are subject to the law should also be its authors. ' '23 A theory of
just membership, according to this view, will imply full participation
by noncitizens (residents) in the origination of rules and regulations
24
to which they are subject.
With regard to the second issue, the question has been whether
there are any moral or legal duties that would require territorial
units to admit those in need of shelter and sustenance or whether
every territorial community has the unfettered right to refuse
admission to anyone outside its territory for any reason at all. Again,
some commentators argue that theories of democracy and justice
would grant territorial units an unfettered right to accept or reject
outsiders on any ground whatsoever, 25 while others suggest that a

23.
BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 217; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 79-80 (1998) ("The
citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons subject to the
laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring for
themselves."); Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah,in FISS, supra note 19, at 19-21
(arguing that immigrants subject to U.S. laws should benefit from its protections, even
if they are not accorded full political rights and privileges of citizens). Bickel indicates
why "persons" rather than "citizens" is the basic unit of American constitutional law by
noting that "[a] relationship between government and the governed that turns on
citizenship can always be dissolved or denied .... It has always been easier, it always
will be easier, to think of someone as a noncitizen than to decide that he is a nonperson .... Id. Hauke Brunkhorst makes a similar argument defending an ideal of
peoplehood that is "an inclusive community of the affected." See HAUKE BRUNKHORST,
SOLIDARITY: FROM CIvic FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY 169-71 (Jeffrey
Flynn trans., 2005). In a sustained and very interesting critique of what they call
"citizenship as inherited property," Ayelete Shachar and Ran Hirschl analogize
birthright citizenship to intergenerational transfer of property and recommend taxing
that transfer to aid people who are destined to live in less desirable parts of the world.
See generally Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as Inherited Property,35 POL.
THEORY 253 (2007).
24.
This is what Alexander Aleinikoff refers to as "lawful settlement as
membership." ALEINIKOFF, supra note 19, at 50-54. This, of course, excludes illegal
immigrants.
25.
The claim that the idea of sovereignty entitles governments to exclude any
outsider from entering the political community has considerable support both in
political theory and international law. In a case decided toward the end of the
nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court made this observation:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States as part of those sovereign
delegated by the constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
At the turn of the last century, the Privy Council (of the United Kingdom) made a
similar observation. See Att'y-Gen. for Can. v. Cain, C.R. [1906] A.C. 542 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Ont.) Q'One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is
the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State ....").Emer de Vattel's The
Law of Nations presents an early statement of the principle of international law:
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theory of justice would require territorial units to admit at least
certain of the people that seek to join the political community. 26 The
issue of which ones among the many that seek admission ought to be
27
allowed in is often a moving target.

[N]o nation can, without good reasons, refuse even a perpetual residence to a
man driven from his country. But, if particular and substantial reasons prevent
her from affording him an asylum, this man has no longer any right to demand
it .... [I]f the country inhabited by this nation is scarcely sufficient for herself,
she is under no obligation to allow a band of foreigners to settle in it for
ever ....
EMER DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, § 231, at 108-09, bk 2., § 125, at 180
(Joseph Chitty Esq. ed., 1883). For a similar view in political theory, see WALZER,
supra note 11, at 39 ("At some level of political organization, something like the
sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions
policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants.").
26.
Here one thinks about political refugees and asylum seekers. Even Michael
Walzer, perhaps one of the most ardent advocates of the right of communities to police
their borders to ensure the uniqueness of their character, agrees that "victims of
political or religious persecution ... make the most forceful claims for admission."
WALZER, supra note 11, at 49. Indeed, there are international obligations. See United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (outlining rights guaranteed to refugees). The Convention defines a
refugee as a person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Id. art. 1, A(2). See
generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2005) (presenting an analysis of human rights of refugees). Using Kant's notion of the
right to universal hospitality, Seyla Benhabib notes that "if it means anything at all,
[it] imposes an obligation on the political sovereign, by prohibiting states from denying
refuge and asylum to those whose intentions are peaceful and if refusing them sojourn
would result in their demise." SEYLA BENHABIB ET AL., ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 25

(Robert Post ed., 2006). By "hospitality" Benhabib "mean[s] to refer to all human rights
claims which are cross-border in scope." Id. at 31; see also Abizadeh, supra note 19, at
48 (arguing that "closed border entry policy could be democratically legitimate only if
its justification is addressed to both members and nonmembers or is addressed to
members whose unilateral right to control entry policy itself receives a justification
addressed to all").
27.
There are still others who view the morality of immigration to go beyond
the admission of a certain number of distressed people. Mathias Risse, for example,
argues immigration should be "a moral problem that must be considered in the context
of global justice" starting from the proposition "that the earth belongs to humanity in
common and that this matters for assessing immigration policy." Mathias Risse, On the
Morality of Immigration, 22 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 25, 25 (2008). He states:
The point of thinking about the earth as collectively owned is not to
establish human despotism over the rest of the earth, organic or inorganic, but
to emphasize that all human beings, no matter when and where they were
born, are in some sense symmetrically located with regard to the earth's
resources and cannot be arbitrarily excluded from them by accidents of space
and time.
Id. at 28.
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At any rate, the two issues just outlined deal only with the rights
of immigrants or would-be immigrants in relation to host countries or
countries of destination. So, to the extent that scholars explore the
question of we the people, they often do so in relation to the host land
or would-be host land.
As noted earlier, this Article goes in the opposite direction,
exploring a relationship that has been almost totally neglected (at
least by legal scholars), but one that would shed light on the nature of
political communities and the sources of legal and political obligations
in the era of globalization: the relationship between diasporas and
homelands or countries of origin. 28 The issue becomes more
interesting and more difficult when there is deep disagreement
between the diaspora and the government of the homeland about the
identity and future of the homeland. The relationship between
diaspora and homeland in this sense is often similar to the
relationship between universities and their alumni. In both cases, the
dispute is often about the identity of a former home that has played
29
and continues to play a central role in the lives of people.
While the relationship between host land and immigrants (or
would-be immigrants) is different from the relationship between
homeland and diaspora in a number of ways, the two raise the same
fundamental question: how a primary social good (membership) is
distributed, and thus how communities constitute and reconstitute
30
themselves to remain "communities of character."
Perhaps it could be argued that the notion of protecting
communities of character cannot be raised with the same intensity in
the relationship between diasporas and homelands as it would be
between host lands and immigrants or would-be immigrants. This is
so, it might be argued, because immigrants or would-be immigrants
are more likely to be strangers to the culture and value system of the
host land, such that it would be reasonable for existing members of
the host land to fear that their uncontrolled membership would
transform the character of the community. Diasporas, on the other
hand, are no strangers to the values and cultures of their homelands,
and thus the fear of strangers transforming the community cannot
have the same saliency. Although true to some degree, this
observation does not capture fully the nature of the relationship
between diasporas and homelands. First, to some extent, diasporas

28.
An exception to this almost total silence is Anupam Chander, Diaspora
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005 (2001). Indeed, it is this article that triggered most of
the questions that this essay has pursued.
29.
See Ed Haldeman & John H. Mathias Jr., Letter to the Editor, Dartmouth:
Let's Avoid Divisive Politics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at A13; Editorial, Dartmouth
Diminished, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2007, at A18; Editorial, The Illiberal College, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1, 2007, at A6.
30.
The phrase is Michael Walzer's. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 62.
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are estranged from their homeland. Some members of the diaspora
might have left because of dissatisfaction with the political or cultural
life of the homeland. Their departure indicates an estrangement of
sorts. Second, even if such estrangement was not the source of their
emigration, they are likely to have developed cultural, political, and
economic belief systems rooted in their new homes, belief systems
that may be at odds with the belief systems in the homeland. Third,
many of the diasporas might have lived outside the homeland for a
long time, and the homeland may have changed significantly during
that period. Their image of the homeland might therefore be at odds
with the reality prevailing in their old country. 3 1 Fourth, in some
circumstances, individuals within diasporas might not even have
lived in the homeland at all, either because they were born outside
the country or the new homeland was established after their
departure.
The point is not to argue that diasporas are, therefore, strangers
to the homeland in the full sense of the term, but rather to note that
the issue of membership raised in regard to the relationship between
diasporas and homelands is not qualitatively different from that
raised by the relationship between host land and would-be
immigrants. They are both about communal self-determination and
the circumstances that threaten to undermine the capacity to achieve
it.3 2

III. "WE THE PEOPLE"
At bottom, the relationship between diasporas and homelands,
whether in the course of agreement or disagreement between the
former and governmental authorities of the latter, raises the issue of
who constitutes we the people-whether for this or that purpose we
the people of the homeland ought to include diasporas. And if so, in
relation to what activities or arenas of action would that be
appropriate? And what are the consequences of thinking of diasporas
as members of the homeland for this or that purpose?
As noted earlier, we the people is the opening phrase of two of
the most famous constitutive documents currently in force. The UN
Charter, the founding document of the world body that was
established in 1945, begins with "We the Peoples of the United

Diasporas "often preserve an image of the national culture that is frozen in
31.
time and does not reflect contemporary changes in the homeland society." Baubock,
supra note 22, at 2416. Benedict Anderson refers to diaspora mobilization as "longdistance nationalism." See BENEDICT ANDERSON, THE SPECTRE OF COMPARISONS:
NATIONALISM, SOUTHEAST ASIA,AND THE WORLD 58-74 (1998).

32.

See discussion on the Hungarian diaspora infra note 109.
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Nations." 33 In this, the Charter was invoking the words of another
constitutive document adopted more than 150 years earlier, the
Constitution of the United States, which begins, "We the People of the
United States. '34 Each document announces that we the people have
come to "establish" certain things (constitutional order in the case of
the U.S. Constitution, the United Nations in the case of the UN
Charter), even as it simultaneously constitutes the very "we" that is
meant to act in a particular way. In that sense, the two political/legal
documents are performative in nature. They constitute that which
they declare already exists. 35 Writing about the invocation of we the
people to establish the U.S. constitutional order, Edmund Morgan
observes, "[tihe very existence of such a thing as the people, capable of
acting to empower, define, and limit a previously non-existent
government required a suspension of disbelief. History recorded no
'36
such action.

U.N. Charter pmbl.
33.
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ('We the People of the United States... do ordain
34.
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."). It is not just the
Constitution but the Declaration of Independence as well that appropriates the notion
of peoplehood. The Declaration begins: "When in the Course of human events, it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected
them with another." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)
(emphasis added).
This simultaneous action of declaration and constitution was referred to as
35.
"performative" by the late great French social theorist-Pierre Bourdieu. PIERRE
BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 223 (John B. Thompson ed., Matthew

Adamson trans., 1991). Performative discourse attempts "to bring about what it asserts
in the very act of asserting it." Id. The notion of performative discourse had its popular
entry in J.L. Austin's work. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed.
1975). Austin famously argued that language can not only describe things but actually
do things. Id. at 94. Thus, for example, when the President swings a bottle of
champagne at a ship and says "I christen this ship the 'USS New Orleans,"' the
President is not merely describing a christening, but performing one. See id. at 5-6 ("In
these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence ... is not to describe my
doing ... it is to do it."). Not surprisingly, Austin called these sorts of verbal acts
"performatives." Id. at 6.
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
36.
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 58 (1988). Robert Dahl makes a similar point

when he observes: "[Hiow to decide who legitimately make up 'the people'.. is a
problem almost totally neglected by all the great political philosophers who write about
democracy." ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY

60 (1970). The incompatible demands that are put on the notion of the people goes back
to the social contract of Hobbes who wished the original contract to serve as the
foundation of all shared and common standards and rules while also wishing it to be a
contract that assumes an already existing shared and common standards of the kind,
an assumption that apparently cannot exist prior to the contract. The notion of the
people therefore seems to suffer from a similar internal contradiction as the original
contract. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962). For
a more recent and direct expression of the performative nature of the notion of "the
people," see CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 268 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,

2008) ('The people are anterior to and above the constitution ....
constitution presupposes such a people capable of action.").

Every democratic
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What is designated by the notion we the people? As a conceptual
matter, the phrase is ambiguous, but at a minimum it suggests the
existence of an entity that is more than the aggregation of
individuals. It indicates the existence of institutions and historical
narratives that link these individuals into a corporate body capable of
agency. 37 But this does not resolve the ambiguity altogether, for there
may be different institutional links and hence different arrangements
and different levels of agency. The notion of people in the American
Declaration of Independence 38 is surely different from that in the
preamble of the U.S. Constitution, 39 for the institutional links and
historical narratives that tied individuals into an entity called the
people differed. Phrases such as "the Jewish people," "the Armenian
people," or "Indigenous people" demonstrate a still more radically
different understanding of the people.
There are at least four different senses in which the phrase the
people seems to have been invoked. The first and the most common
use is as a substitute for a territorial political unit. Thus, we the
people in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution might be understood
to refer to the various confederated states ("we the states") that were
coming together to form a "more perfect union. 40 The same phrase in
the UN Charter clearly refers to the various nation-states assembled
in San Francisco to found the United Nations, rather than the
undifferentiated people of the world. Indeed, the plural, "peoples,"
'4 1
indicates that the phrase is a substitute for "we the nation-states.

37.
By "agency" I mean to refer to circumstances where the relevant entity
(community, people, etc.) "has attitudes on the issues it faces and acts so as to pursue
those attitudes." Christian List & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Can There Be a Global
Demos? An Agency-Based Approach, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 76, 91 (2010). To pursue
these attitudes (e.g. preferences), the collectivity needs to have in place "organizational
structure[s]." Id. Thus, for there to be agency, two conditions must be met: it must be
possible to ascribe coherent attitudes to the entity (group), and there must be
organizational structure (rules, procedures, conventions, etc.) through which these
attitudes are pursued. But, of course, "a certain degree of diversity within a group is
entirely consistent with" the idea of agency. Id. at 95.
38.
The Declaration begins: "When in the Course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
39.
See Benjamin Lee, Peoples and Publics, 10 PUB. CULTURE 371, 378 (1998)
("Despite the apparent continuity between the 'we' of the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution, it is immediately evident that this relationship is a historically
constructed one that links two different subjects.").
40.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.").
41.
The Charter makes this sensibility clear in its list of purposes and
principles to which the organization was to be committed. One of the purposes of the
United Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter art. 1,
para. 2 (emphasis added). It is clear that the word "peoples" is meant to refer to
political entities, and the self-determination that is envisaged here is the freedom of
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The concluding paragraph of the preamble makes that clear.4 2 John
Rawls uses the term peoples in his book The Law of Peoples in a way
that is similar to the Charter, to refer to the various political
communities in the world.43 Rawls's peoples are politically organized
societies and their form of organization is essentially statehood.
Peoplehood in this first sense is a marker of a political entity that is
territorially delimited, not so much a nation (for there may be many
nations within that political unit), but a political "community of
44
character," as Walzer would say.
A second use of the phrase refers to the citizens of a particular
political community. Thus, when an American politician invokes the
phrase "the American people," he or she means to emphasize the
institutions and narratives that link citizen inhabitants as one entity.
It is never clear what size of the inhabitants (majority, supermajority,
a few thousand?) the speakers have in mind when they invoke the
authority of the American people. But whatever size is thought to
justify the invocation, the constitutive narrative of the notion of the
American people is American citizenship, as would be French
citizenship when the phrase "the French people" is invoked. 45 The
People in this second sense is not a mere collection of individuals that
happen to occupy the territorial unit we call the United States or
France, but citizens as a corporate entity. This is peoplehood
4
inscribed by citizenship."

territorial entities from imperial and colonial interference. See ANDREW KUPER,
DEMOCRACY

BEYOND

BORDERS:

JUSTICE

AND

REPRESENTATION

IN

GLOBAL

INSTITUTIONS 159 n.310 (2006) (remarking 'We the peoples' at the beginning of the UN
Charter was introduced to replace the original 'the high contracting parties [i.e.
states]', avowedly as a public relations exercise by Eleanor Roosevelt to appeal to the
many members of the American Public who previously spurned the League of Nations"
(alteration in original)).
42.
"Accordingly, our [the peoples'] respective Governments, through
representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco ...have agreed to the present
Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to
be known as the United Nations." U.N. Charter pmbl.
43.
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 16, at 23-30. To be sure, Rawls
attempts to make a distinction between peoples and political states, but for our purpose
here those distinctions do not matter.
44.
See WALZER, supranote 11, at 62.
45.
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen opens with
the following: "The representatives of the French people." DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS
OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN pmbl. (Fr. 1789).

46.
A rather interesting notion of peoplehood is the Marxist version, at least
Mao Tse-tung's version. Here is how Mao defined the Chinese people:
Workers, peasants, urban petit-bourgeois elements, patriotic intellectuals,
patriotic capitalists and other patriots together comprise more than ninety-five
per cent of the whole country's population. Under our people's democratic
dictatorship, all of these come within the classification of the people. And
among the people we must practise democracy. Those whom the people's
democratic dictatorship should repress are: landlords, rich peasants, counter-
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A third notion of peoplehood refers to all inhabitants of a
political community. What organizes and inscribes individuals as a
people here is not citizenship, but the fact of sharing a specific
territorial unit and being subject to the jurisdiction of that unit. Thus,
the reference to "people" in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution
has been understood and interpreted to include all residents (and
certainly includes permanent residents) within the territorial limit of
the United States, and are thus subject to its jurisdiction. 47 The
48
notion of people here is jurisdictional.
The above three senses in which the phrase the people is invoked
are tied to territorial (geographic) political communities. This may be
referred to as political peoplehood defined by territorial limits.
Although the compositional criterion may vary from one to the other,
defined territory is constant in all.
There is a fourth sense of peoplehood which appears not to be
tied to the notion of territorial political community. Thus, "the Jewish
people" refers to a cultural or religious peoplehood rather than to a
territorial political community (at least until the establishment of
Israel). One could say the same thing about the Armenian people, at
least until the establishment of the Armenian state. Here, ethnic,
racial, or religious narratives constitute the people. This notion of

revolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist rightists.... These
are the people we must compel to reform. They are the people whom the
people's democratic dictatorship is directed against.
MAO TSE-TUNG, CHAIRMAN MAO TALKS TO THE PEOPLE: TALKS AND LETTERS: 19561971, at 169-70 (Stuart Schram ed., John Chinnery & Tieyun trans., 1974), quoted in
Lee, supra note 39, at 384.
47.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law... abridging ... the right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."); see also id. amend. II ("[T]he right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); id. amend. IV ('The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
search and seizure, shall not be violated .. "); id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."). The U.S. Supreme Court understood the notion of the phrase
the people in the Amendments to mean "a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 259-60 (1990). The jurisdictional view of the people is also reflected in
international human rights documents such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, where a state is required to provide the rights set out in the
covenant to all people under its jurisdiction. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 2,
1, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
48.
Robert Dahl seems to hold such a view. DAHL, supra note 23, at 78-80
('The citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons subject
to the laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring
for themselves.").
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people may be referred to as ethno-cultural peoplehood, in which "the
49
affectivity criterion" determines membership.
As discussed later, the two categories-ethno-cultural and
political peoplehood-are not totally distinct. They sometimes
overlap. Perhaps the policy of the government of Germany, until
relatively recently, showed that overlap. The official policy of the
German government was that we the people provisionally included
citizens and residents of other countries that possessed German
"blood. '50 Individuals were entitled to claim German citizenship and
join the territorial community called Germany. One could also view
the policy of Israel that allows (and encourages) Jews from all over
the world to immigrate to the State of Israel as an example of the
overlap between political and ethno-cultural peoplehoods. 51 Perhaps
Walzer was thinking of Israel when he claimed that "nations look for
'52
countries because in some deep sense they already have countries.
But as a general matter, the relationship between modern
diasporas and homelands does not fit either category clearly or
cleanly. On the one hand, diasporas' links to homelands appear more
cultural than political, somewhat similar to what Arthur Isak
Applbaum calls the "anthropologicalsense of peoplehood. '' 53 On the

49.

List & Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 37, at 81.

50.

German citizenship legislation is traditionally strongly based on jus
sanguinis, which previously meant that it was easier for people of
German ethnicity with very limited ties to Germany to acquire German
citizenship than for foreigners who had lived in Germany for decades.
In 1992 legislation was changed to increase possibilities for secondgeneration immigrants to obtain citizenship ....

Tanja Brondsted Sejersen, '7 Vow to Thee My Countries": The Expansion of Dual
Citizenship in the 21st Century, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 523, 541 (2008); see also
David Abraham, Constitutional Patriotism, Citizenship, and Belonging, 6 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 137, 146-52 (2008) ("[D]espite the rapid growth of the foreigner population,
until 2000 a child acquired German citizenship only by descent from a German
parent."); Eniko Horvgith & Ruth Rubio-Marin, 'Alles oder Nichts'? The Outer
Boundaries of the German Citizenship Debate, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 72, 72-85 (2010)
(examining the evolution of access to German citizenship); Christian Joppke,
Citizenship Between De- and Re-Ethnicization, 44 EUR. J. SOCIO. 429, 430-32 (2003)
(arguing based on an examination of French and German citizenship models that a
tension between de- and re-ethnicization of membership is inherent in the nature of a
state and structurally rooted in immigrationand emigration).
51.
See Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.ilMFAIMFAArchive/1950-19591Law+of+Return+5710-1950.htm;
see also Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of
Security, Nationality, and Human Rights, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 184, 184-86, 191-92
(2008) (discussing the Law of Return in the context of amendments to Israel's
citizenship law prohibiting entry of Palestinians from occupied territories for residence
and naturalization purposes).
52.
WALZER, supra note 11, at 44.
53.
See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Forcing a People To Be Free, 35 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 359, 374 (2007).
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other hand, many diasporas often seem to view themselves as part of
the people in the political sense, at times encouraged by homeland
governments. 54 They seek not only to affirm cultural, ethnic, or
religious affiliations with the homeland (an affirmation of identity),
but also to participate in the shaping of the economic and political life
of the homeland, sometimes positively but other times negatively. 55
Here peoplehood is not just a matter of common sentiment and
shared cultural outlook; it is also a matter of "the capacity for shared
agency," 56 which Arthur Isak Applbaum refers to as "normative
''57
peoplehood.
In the era of communication technologies that allow wide and
instant contact across the globe, the power of diasporas to intervene
in and shape the political and economic life of the homeland is
increasing in significance. The narratives of political and ethnocultural peoplehoods seem inadequate to describe the character of the
community imagined by the relationship between diasporas and
homeland. Diasporas are not members of the political community of
the homeland in the traditional territorial sense, but neither are they
strangers to it. The categories of members and strangers in the
traditional sense do not seem to capture the complicated relationship
between diasporas and homelands. 58 They are not simply part of an
anthropological people, but neither do they seem to manifest a full
capacity of agency in relation to the homeland. That is, the link
between the diaspora and the people of the homeland is not simply
anthropological, nor does it seem fully normative. It occupies the
ambiguous middle that some have referred to as "the diasporic
space." 59 It is to capture this ambiguous space that some have
'60
referred to diasporas as "outside the state but inside the people.

54.
See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
55.
The role of the Haitian diaspora in financing and fomenting coups is
perhaps one well-known example. See Michel S. Laguerre, Homeland Political Crisis,
The Virtual Diasporic Public Sphere, and Diasporic Politics, 10 J. LATIN AM.
ANTHROPOLOGY 206, 207 (2005) (recounting the coups led by Haitian diaspora rebels).
56.
Applbaum, supra note 53, at 374 ("[W]hat makes for normative peoplehood
is the capacity for shared agency. A people in the normative sense must be capable of
willing as a people.").
57.
Id.
58.
The inadequacy of some of the current categories we employ was
beautifully captured by Cornel West when he was asked whether he was "optimistic
about the future." His reply was, 'The categories of optimism and pessimism don't exist
for me. I'm a blues man. A blues man is a prisoner of hope, and hope is a qualitatively
different category than optimism." Robert S. Boynton, Cornel West, ROLLING STONE,
Nov. 15, 2007, at 116.
59.
See James Clifford, Diasporas,9 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 302, 314 (1994)
(discussing "common experiences of postcolonial displacement, racialization, and
political struggle"); see also AVTAR BRAH, CARTOGRAPHIES OF DIASPORA: CONTESTING
IDENTITIES 208-10 (1996) ("Diaspora space is the intersectionality of diaspora, border,
and dis/location as a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural, and psychic
processes."); Jacqueline Nassy Brown, Black Liverpool, Black America and the
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The diaspora-homeland relationship also defies another very
popular category often employed to classify disputes and
relationships in international legal and political discoursenationalist (localist) versus cosmopolitan (universalist). A nationalist
or localist takes local or national communities as the proper venues
for allegiances and commitments, while a universalist believes that
61
the highest allegiance ought to be to the community of humankind.
But diasporas seem neither members of the homeland (owed special
allegiances and commitments) nor strangers to it (with no allegiance
or commitment). And to the extent that universalism and localism are
meant to exhaust the nature of commitments and relationships
people owe one another, they do not capture the diaspora-homeland
relationship. 62 However, it is complex relationships like this that will
increasingly define international relations and international law
itself.
This suggests that there is a need for a theory that captures the
notion of peoplehood in both its anthropological and normative
sense-a theory that is sensitive to the complex relationship not fully
captured by the accounts offered by nationalists and universalists.
Such a theory must also suggest the institutional and practical
implications of adopting the notion of peoplehood implied by the
complex relationship between diasporas and homelands. It is the
ambiguous middle ground-neither strangers nor members, neither
local nor cosmopolitan, neither political nor ethno-cultural-that is
increasingly defining our world. Finding the language to capture it
and to respond institutionally to it is going to be the challenge of legal
and political theory in the twenty-first century.

Gendering of Diasporic Space, 13 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 291, 298 (1998)
("[D]espite invitations to universal identification, not everyone partakes in the
privileges of membership to the diasporic community with impunity.").
60.
SHAIN, supra note 10, at 124 (emphasis omitted).
61.
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE
OF COUNTRY 2, 4-5 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). Some of the worthy goals that
patriotism sets out to serve-for example, the goal of national unity in devotion
to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality... would be better served by an
ideal that is in any case more adequate to our situation in the contemporary
world, namely the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose
allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings.

Id.
62.

For an exploration of the various boundaries of allegiances, see generally

SAMUEL SCHEFFLER,

BOUNDARIES

OF ALLEGIANCES:

PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE

AND

RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT (2004) (collecting eleven essays discussing social
arrangements and individual responses to those arrangements).
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IV. DIASPORAS AS PART OF WE THE PEOPLE?
A. Understandingthe Notion of the Diaspora
Diasporas have existed throughout human history. 63 The notion
of diaspora 64 refers to groups of individuals or communities who carry
an image of a homeland that is separate from the host land in which
they reside. 65 The image of the homeland could be real (an existing
country) or imagined (e.g. homelands for Sikhs, Kurds, Chechens, and
Sri Lankan Tamils 66). The fellow-feeling or common origin that
members of the diaspora believe they have is often reinforced by
others' perception of them-diasporas perceive themselves and are
67
perceived by others as belonging to a national community.
Diasporas come in many forms. Some members of the diaspora
are forced out of their homeland for religious, cultural, or political
reasons, while others may have simply left to seek a better life for
themselves and their descendants. Some may not even have moved at
all, but the border shifted either through imperial and colonial

63.
See THE NEW EUROPEAN DIASPORAS: NATIONAL MINORITIES AND CONFLICT
IN EASTERN EUROPE 2 (Michael Mandelbaum ed., 2000) (stating that
"[d]iasporas ... are ancient features of human history" and discussing the first
recorded diaspora when the kingdom of Judea was conquered by the Assyrians and
Jews were forced into "the Babylonian captivity"); see also Robin Cohen, Diasporasand
the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers, 72 INT'L AFF. 507, 513 (1996) (giving
examples of diasporas that transcend millennia).
64.
The term "diaspora" is derived from the Greek term diaspeirein, which
means to sow or scatter about (dia means apart and speirein means to sow or scatter).
Diaspora,THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 502 (4th ed. 2006); see also Cohen,
supra note 63, at 507 ("For the Greeks, the expression was used to describe the
colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean in the Archaic period (800-600
BC).").
65.
Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth define diaspora thus: "[A] people with
common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of
their ethnic or religious homeland-whether that homeland is real or symbolic,
independent or under foreign control." Yossi Shain & Aharon Barth, Diasporas and
International Relations Theory, 57 INT'L ORG. 449, 452 (2003); see also Chander,
DiasporaBonds, supra note 28, at 1020 (defining diaspora as "that part of a people,
dispersed in one or more countries other than its homeland, that maintains a feeling of
transnational community among a people and its homeland"); Cohen, supra note 63, at
515. Cohen lists what he considers to be the common features of a diaspora. The list is
adapted from an earlier list drawn by William Safran. See William Safran, Comparing
Diasporas:A Review Essay, 8 DIASPORAS 255, 257 (1999); William Safran, Diasporasin
Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return, 1 DIASPORAS 83-84 (1991) (listing a
"continuum" of features of diasporas).
66.
The Sikhs dream of Khalistan, the Kurds often talk about a Kurdistan that
embraces all of the Kurds that are scattered in the various Middle Eastern countries
(Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey), Sri Lankan Tamils sought to establish Tamil Elam,
and the Chechens have been fighting for an independent Chechnya.
67.
SHAIN, supra note 10, at 11. Diasporas "regard themselves, or are regarded
by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their
homeland." Id.
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conquest or the break-up of nation-states.6 8 Some consider the host
land a temporary stopping place, while others may be permanent
residents and even citizens of the host country. In whichever way
they are constituted, diasporas possess one common feature: although
they have made the host land their place of residence (temporarily or
permanently), they carry an image of a homeland to which they
believe they belong and in which they consider to have a legitimate
stake. Imagining is an important defining feature of all diasporas.
Diasporas imagine a homeland that is separate from the host land,
even as they imagine the homeland-host land space as one and
continuous. One author sought to capture the diasporic space this
way: "[W]here the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the
country of residence a source of rights, and the emerging
transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or
''69
more countries.
Not only do diasporas carry an image of a homeland (imagined or
otherwise), they often also seek to play a role in the economic,
cultural, and political life of that homeland. When the interests of the
diaspora and that of the government of the homeland converge, there
is often very little to worry about. Each party finds the other useful.
Diasporas use the homeland as a source of cultural sustenance and
pride, a kind of cultural refueling depot. 70 They may also find a
favorable investment climate within their homeland. The government
of the homeland may use the diaspora as a powerful lobby group in
the host land, facilitating its economic and foreign policies vis-a-vis

68.
The collapse of the USSR and the resulting Russian diaspora found in the
various republics that made up the Soviet Union is a good example of a diaspora that
emerged as a result of the disintegration of a nation-state or an empire, depending on
one's point of view. For an account of the Russian diaspora, see Graham Smith,
TransnationalPolitics and the Politics of the Russian Diaspora,22 ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 500 (1999) (providing a "conceptual framework for exploring the diasporic
politics of the Russians in the post-Soviet borderlands"). See also NATIONS ABROAD:
DIASPORA POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

(Charles King & Neil J. Melvin eds., 1998) (focusing on "trans-border ethnic
populations for the domestic politics and international relations of the Soviet successor
states"). And to some extent this is what many Latinos say about their presence in the
southwestern part of the United States. The division of the Afar people between
Ethiopia and Eritrea is another example of a moving border.
69.
Kastoryano, supra note 1, at 311.
70.
I must note here that in some circumstances the reverse might be true.
Some diasporas-the Armenian diaspora is a good example-have their own elaborate
cultural institutions, structures, and hierarchies that dwarf those in the homeland.
This may be so for a couple of reasons: the relative size and wealth of the diaspora.
Under such circumstances, it may be the homeland that depends on the diaspora for
cultural sustenance rather than the reverse. But these are very rare circumstances.
See, e.g., Susan P. Pattie, Armenians in Diaspora, in THE ARMENIANS: PAST AND
PRESENT IN THE MAKING OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 126, 131-39 (Edmund Herzig &

Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2005) (discussing Armenian diasporas in a variety of
countries).
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the host land or any other part of the world over which the host land
has influence.7 1 The diaspora may also be useful as a direct source of
73
72
economic assistance, both in terms of remittance and investment.
This is especially true in relation to poor developing countries whose
diasporas live in rich, developed countries. It is, for example, reported
that the Eritrean economy would be in more serious difficulty were it
not for the remittance and other forms of economic assistance it
74
receives from the Eritrean diaspora.

71.
See generally Terrazas, supra note 4 (discussing how the Ethiopian
government set up diaspora affairs within its foreign ministry partly to "mobilize the
diaspora to improve the public image of Ethiopia").
72.
"[Migrants from poor countries send home about $300 billion a year. That
is more than three times the global total in foreign aid, making 'remittances' the main
source of outside money flowing to the developing world." Jason DeParle, Migrant
Money Flow: A $300 Billion Current, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at WK3, available at
http://www.nytimes.coml2007/11/18/weekinreview/18deparle.html;
see also Ngozi
Okonj-Iweala & Dilip Ratha, A Bond for the Homeland, FOREIGN POLICY (May 24, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/24/a_bondforthehomeland
("Migrants
from developing countries sent more than $325 billion in remittances last year."). It is
estimated that a third of that amount comes from the United States. DeParle, supra; see
also WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: STRIVING FOR STABILITY IN
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 157-172 (2003) (discussing how remittances have become a

"prominent source of external funding for many developing countries"); Terrence

Lyons, Diasporasand Homeland Conflict, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA

OF GLOBALIZATION 111, 112-13 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006)
("According to the [2004] report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on
Remittances ... remittances accounted for nearly 30 percent of Nicaragua's GDP, 25
percent of Haiti's, 17 percent of Guyana's, 15 percent of El Salvador's, and 12 percent
each for Honduras and Jamaica."). Remittance from the diaspora is not a new
phenomenon. It is reported that in 1901 "the Italian government passed a law
empowering the nonprofit Banco di Napoli to open branches or contract with banks in
the United States to enable migrants to send remittances reliably and cheaply." Nancy
Foner, Engagements Across National Borders, Then and Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2483, 2485 (2007).

73.

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.

74.

[T]he
diaspora's financial
contributions
have
always been
critical.... Remittances were critical during the 1998-2000 war and
have become ever more important. In order to maintain their full
rights as citizens-particularly valuable if at some later date they wish
to return and claim property or open a business-Eritreans abroad are
expected to 'voluntarily' pay 2 per cent of their monthly salaries to the
government.

Int'l Crisis Group, Eritrea:The Siege State, Africa Report No. 163, 18 (Sept. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/medialFiles/africalhorn-of-africa/ethiopiaeritrea/163%2OEritrea%2OThe%20Siege%20State. It is reported that remittance from
the diaspora constitutes 38 percent of the country's gross domestic product.
Mohammed Ali & Alain Hutchinson, Contribution from CTA to the Report on "Food
Security Issues in ACP countries and the Role of ACP-EU Cooperation," ACP-EU
TECHNICAL

CENTRE

FOR

AGRIC.

&

RuRAL

DEV.,

3

(Nov.

17,

2007),

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/91_01/pdflcta.pdf (referencing investment as
a form of direct economic assistance). Another example of a country receiving
substantial remittances is Ethiopia: Ethiopia "receives a significant amount of
remittances from its migrants." Kenneth A. Reinert, Ethiopia in the World Economy:
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Put simply, when diasporas and homeland governments see eye
to eye on many issues, or when each is happy to use the other for its
own purposes, the ambiguous diaspora-homeland relationship (the
issue of membership) remains unexplored. However, when tensions
exist between the two in terms of the image each has of the homeland
and the future each envisions for it, then the appropriate level of
involvement of the diaspora in the life of the country becomes an
issue. Membership-who exactly we the people are and who speaks
for the people-arises as a serious issue. Are members of the diaspora
legitimate members of the political community of the homeland? Do
they have rights in relation to the homeland that are not within the
power of the government of the homeland "to give or deny?" 75 And
what might those rights be?
B. Diasporaas the "ParadigmaticOther" of the
Nation-State:Identity and Otherness
In many ways the diaspora is the "paradigmatic Other of the
nation-state. '76 Diasporas define themselves in contrast to the nationstate. While the nation-state conceives of peoplehood (the notion of
"we") in territorial terms, the idea of the diaspora enacts a
nonterritorial, traveling notion of peoplehood. While the nation-state

Trade, Private Capital Flows, and Migration, 53 AFRICA TODAY 65, 78 (2007). It is
reported that in 2000 remittances made up 40 percent of all foreign direct investment
in Ethiopia, while in 2002 they constituted 45 percent and in 2001 a staggering 90
percent. See id. at 79.
75.
See Sewenet Kenennie, TPLF-The Control Freak and Diaspora
Ethiopians, ETHIOMEDIA.COM (June 18, 2006), http://ethiomedia.com/carepress/tplfthe-control-freak.html. A member of the Ethiopian diaspora who apparently lived in
the United States and is presumably a citizen of the United States responded to a
memorandum that the Ethiopian government had apparently sent out to its embassies
in countries where there is a substantial Ethiopian diaspora. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ETHIOPIA, http://www.mfa.gov.et/Ethiopians-Origin-Abroad/EthiopiaOrigin.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). The memorandum suggested intimidating
tactics against those members of the diaspora who are perceived as being hostile to the
regime. The online commentary from this individual goes this way: "I am also an
Ethiopian, not only by blood but sentiment, character and the deep love I have for my
family, friends and by extension the people of that country-which by the way is not up
to [the Ethiopian government] to give or deny." The commentator apparently believes
that the diaspora are part of the people of the homeland and that right cannot be
denied by any government. It is of course not quite clear why it is so and whether
"blood" and "sentiment" are sufficient grounds for full membership to a political
community even if formal citizenship has been renounced. And what does it mean to
say that one is tied to a country by "blood"?
76.
Khachig TS161yan, The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preference,
1 DIASPORA 3, 3 (1991); see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
GLOBALIZATION: THE POSTMODERN REVIVAL OF CONFEDERATE ARRANGEMENTS 181
(1998) ("A common phenomenon during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, [statediaspora] remained real, if lower key, with the rise of the modern nation-state, whose
exclusivism militated against formal diaspora political expression.").
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conceives of legitimate political participation in essentially territorial
terms, the notion of the diaspora tends to complicate that assumption
by claiming a continuing and active stake in the homeland for those
who have left the homeland either voluntarily or involuntarily. The
diasporic phenomenon seriously challenges and renders ambiguous
the specific notions of peoplehood, community, and belonging that
have defined the nation-state. Diasporic interest in the homeland
attempts to delink the tight relationship that peoplehood and
community are thought to have with territory.
However, there is a paradox. While the notion of diaspora
appears to be the paradigmatic Other of the nation-state, its
existence and coherence is, in fact, premised on the existence of the
nation-state. There are diasporas because there is a homeland or an
imagined homeland, which often manifests itself in the form of a
territorial state. In some sense, this paradox is a necessary feature of
77
all identities. One defines oneself often in opposition to the Other.
The existence of the Other is a necessary condition for defining the
boundary of the self. This is the case whether the identity in question
is individual, communal, or institutional. All identities are defined
78
relationally.
To summarize, the diaspora is viewed simultaneously as the
negation of the nation-state and one that must assume the existence
of the nation-state for its coherence. 79 But the narratives of political

77.
See generally WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC
NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1st ed. 1991) (exploring the relation of identity
to difference); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (noting individuals' tendency to define "difference" as
something inherent in others); MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY,
POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997) (discussing efforts to strike a balance between the
paradoxes of individual and group identities); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) (urging that normative theory and public policy should
undermine group-based oppression by affirming rather than suppressing social group
difference); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism,and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 619 (1992) ('The dominant cultural
understanding and experience of a society tends to universalize itself as the inevitable
norm for social life, marking the culture of the marginal as the 'Other,' either to be
excluded or 'normalized."').
78.
See Addis, supra note 77, at 622 ("Group identities are contingent in the
sense that differences (identities) are established relationally. This means that what
sorts of relationships establish differences, and who gets to define those relationships,
matters.").
79.
Here again the analogy between the relationship between diasporas and
homelands on the one hand, and alumni and colleges on the other hand, is instructive.
The notion of alumni assumes the existence of a college as the notion of diaspora
assumes the existence of a state. Often, the discord between alumni and college
administrators is a result of a differing view of the institution each group holds in the
same way that disputes between diasporas and governments are primarily a
consequence of the different image of the nation and its future that each group has of
the homeland. In addition, in the same way that college administrators often charge
unhappy alumni of having an outdated image of their alma mater, so do governments
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peoplehood that anchor themselves in physical geography are not
adequate models to describe the notion of peoplehood that the
diasporic narrative seeks to constitute. A narrative that anchors itself
in and is circumscribed by the idea of physical geography will be
unable to capture the travelling nature of communities represented
by diasporas, whether ancient or modern.
C. The Diasporaand Ethno-culturalPeoplehood
While the notion of ethno-cultural peoplehood captures the
nonterritorial and traveling nature of communities, it is no better
than the notion of political peoplehood as a means of explaining the
relationship between diasporas and their homelands. The narratives
that constitute ethno-cultural peoplehood often center on religion or
ethnicity, and thus do not offer a full account of the relationship
between modern diasporas and homelands. This is so for a number of
reasons. First, for many modern diasporas the link to homeland is not
primarily based on any specific ethnic or religious affiliation, but
rather on a relationship to a land, its political history, and its societal
culture. Take the Ethiopian diaspora as an example. The members of
the diaspora belong to different ethnic and religious groups. The
constitutive narrative is a narrative of a land of many faiths and
ethnic and linguistic groups, and each religious, ethnic, and linguistic
group links itself to the land and its history (though the history may
be contested among those groups). Put simply, the constitutive
narrative of the Ethiopian diaspora is a narrative of multiplicity.
Second, contrary to what ethno-cultural peoplehood would
suggest, some diasporas (the Ethiopian diaspora, for example) seek
not only a communion over cultural and religious symbols and
rituals, but a desire to participate in the political affairs of the
political community they call homeland. Individuals within the
Ethiopian diaspora have organized political parties; supported
political parties which were organized within (and are based in) the
homeland; and campaigned before the legislative and executive
bodies of their respective host lands so as to isolate and put pressure
on the governments in power that they view as illegitimate, or at
least dictatorial, or to support initiatives that they believe are in the
interest of the nation. Put simply, the Ethiopian diaspora seeks to
expand the notion of political membership beyond the territorial
boundaries and, in the process, to affirm its belonging to we the

of the homeland often allege that diasporas carry an image of a country that has long
ago changed. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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people of Ethiopia. In this, the Ethiopian0 diaspora is not very
8
different from many other modern diasporas.
D. The Significance of the Diasporafor a New
Theory of Peoplehood and Membership

Even though neither the traditional notion of political
peoplehood nor the idea of ethno-cultural peoplehood fully captures
the complex relationship between modern diasporas and homelands,
it is clear that the issue will increasingly be an important one. In the
age of globalization and the communication revolution-when
physical space is becoming less crucial as a definer of communities
and the contours of participation, but, on the other hand, where the
notion of communities and local allegiances are viewed as antidotes to
the dislocating effects of globalization-the relationship between
diasporas and homelands is increasingly moving from the periphery
to the center. Perhaps that relationship holds the key to
understanding and building institutions that can link and hold in
equilibrium the universalizing (homogenizing) and localizing
(fragmenting) tendencies of globalization.
There are, of course, other more specific reasons for the
increasing attractiveness of the diaspora-homeland relationship for
scholars, as well as policymakers. First, in relation to developing
countries, many of which tend to be politically and economically weak
or unstable, the sheer size of the diaspora and its economic and
political clout have often made it a central player in the life of the
homeland.8 1 That role is unlikely to diminish in the near future, for
good or for ill. This, of course, raises the rather important question as
to who we the people are for the purpose of authoring laws and
establishing institutions of the homeland. Democracy, we are often
reminded, requires that the people be the originators of the laws and
institutions that govern their lives.8 2 In what sense would it be
legitimate to think of members of a diaspora as being part of the "we"
of the homeland for purposes of authoring or originating the laws and
institutions that are to govern the homeland and for the purpose of
devising policies affecting the homeland?

80.
For a detailed account of how the Jewish diaspora attempts -to intervene in
the political, cultural, and economic lives of Israel, see SHAIN, supranote 10, at 65-100.
That is the case in countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, and Sri
81.
Lanka. See, e.g., COLLIER & HOEFFLER, infra note 209 and accompanying text.
82.
There are numerous international documents that could be read as
standing for that proposition. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 25 ("Every citizen
shall have the right and the opportunity ...

without unreasonable restrictions ...

[t]o

take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives."); UDHR, supra note 18, art. 21(1) ("Everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.").
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It may be the case that at some level the desire of members of a
diaspora to play a significant role in the imagining of their homeland
is inversely related to how well the particular diasporic community is
integrated in the life of the host land. The more a community feels
marginalized (or discriminated against), the more likely it will seek to
invest energy and resources in the cultivation and imagining of its
former homeland. In this sense, the strength of a diaspora's bond
with the homeland may partly be related to the weakness of its bond
with the host land.8 3 But this is not always, nor even often, the case.
The second way in which the relation between homeland and
diaspora is moving to the center is as a result of the diminishment or
disaggregation of the authority of the nation-state. Power is
migrating from the nation-state in two directions: upward to
supernational institutions and power centers and downward to the
constituent parts of the nation-state, be they public or private.8 4 As a
result of various globalizing phenomena, such as the communication
revolution, the notion of policeable borders-"the idea of a selfenclosed and autochthonous territory over which the demos
governs" 8 5-is
increasingly challenged. The diaspora-homeland
relationship is a clear example of politics beyond nation-state
borders-the globalization of politics. But it is a globalization of a
specific kind. It is a politics beyond the nation-state that affirms a

83.
Charles King & Neil J. Melvin, DiasporaPolitics:Ethnic Linkages, Foreign
Policy, and Security in Eurasia,24 INT'L SECURITY 108, 137 (1999) ("A stronger sense
of attachment between homelands and diasporas may then come about as a result of
conflict within the host state."). See also Andrea Elliott, A Call to Jihad, Answered in
America, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at Al, for a discussion of the rather worrying
phenomenon of a number of young male Somali Americans from Minneapolis
disappearing to be found later to have joined radical Islamists to fight in Somalia. One
friend and family member noted: "[a]t the root of the problem was a 'crisis of
belonging'... They want to belong, but who do they belong to?" Id. It is worth
mentioning a related point here. In some circumstances, the presence of a diaspora
could be used by a segment or segments of the population of the homeland "as a font for
host-land definition... as a differentiating tool of state formation; for example Chinese
diasporas have been used as a 'resource to construct a nationalist Self and a foreign
Other', as personified by anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia in 1998." Chris Ogden,
DiasporaMeets IR's Constructivism:An Appraisal, 28 POL. 1, 3 (2008) (quoting William
A. Callahan, Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: Diasporic Chinese and NeoNationalism in China and Thailand, 57 INT'L ORG. 481, 482 (2003)).
84.
State power is migrating to constituent administrative units such as
provinces or federal states and private entities such as NGOs or even private
companies. An example of power transfer to private companies is the latest move in the
United States where military activities are increasingly being contracted out to private
companies. See P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: PrivatizedMilitary
Firms and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 522 (2004) ("One of the
most interesting developments in warfare over the last decade has been the emergence
of a global trade in hired military services, better known as the 'privatized military
industry.' . . . Even the U.S. military has become one of the prime clients of the
industry.").
85.
BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 216.
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particular idea of a nation-state. It is one that seeks to reconstitute
we the people by stripping it of two conditions that have traditionally
been used to define it: territory and citizenship. And the
communication revolution, which is increasingly allowing members of
the diaspora to communicate (and organize) with citizens of the
homeland almost instantaneously and at increasingly reduced cost,
will continue to encourage more active participation by members of
the diaspora in the political and economic affairs of the homeland.
As noted earlier, if one wishes to explore the notions of
democracy, community, and legality in the age of globalization, then
exploring the relationship between diaspora and homeland may
provide one of the best vehicles. As one commentator put it,
"[d]iasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational
moment. 86 One may add that they are also exemplary communities
that affirm the nation-state. The paradox of globalization is perfectly
captured by diaspora-homeland relationships. And the mediation
between universalism and localism may have its seed in this unique
relationship-a relationship that affirms localism by attempting to
redefine (extend) the local.

V. CONSTITUTING THE PEOPLE IN THE AGE OF THE DIASPORA

A. The Silence of InternationalLaw
As noted earlier, in some significant sense, the diaspora has been
understood to be the Other of the nation-state. And to the extent that
international law has been concerned with interstate relations, the
notion of the diaspora has, by and large, been outside its concern. One
is either a national (or under the jurisdiction) of this or that state.
One is either an alien or a citizen. International law, which was given
life to and sustained over a long period of time by the idea of the
nation-state, has largely been a process of sharp lines, as has been
the subject of its primary concern-the nation-state. For
international law, as for the state system, there is no ambiguous
diasporic space.
It is true that international law is increasingly broadening the
domain of its concern and the kind of actors that it recognizes as
subjects of its signals. Thus, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and even individuals are now recognized as subjects of international
law.8 7 The state is now accountable under international law for what

86.
To11yan, supra note 76, at 5.
87.
See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 1.3-1.5 (2007) (discussing the
rise of NGOs and their role in international law).
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it does to its citizens.8 8 The veil of we the people as the community
personified is pierced to get to the individual, to the extent that
international human rights law is to apply to the action of the state
vis-a-vis its citizens. However, although international law has
expanded its subjects and the domain of its concern, it essentially
continues to adhere to a statist version of we the peoples that graces
the UN Charter. International law may have pierced the statist veil
to reach the individual under certain circumstances, but only in the
context of affirming the traditional narrative of how the people
(personified by the state) are constituted. That is, international law
imposes certain obligations on the state to treat members of its own
people in a particular way, but it does not open to question how the
people are constituted. International law seems to leave the question
of membership to political communities themselves. 89 The people of a
political community determine how they wish to distribute
membership goods, even though international law increasingly
demands accountability in terms of how members are treated (clearly
the purpose of the corpus of international human rights law).
The ambivalence that international law has shown to the issue of
secession is a good example of how it has been rather unconcerned
about the process of the constitution of peoplehood. 90 To be sure,
there have been commentaries in recent years as to whether
democratic governance
has become
an entitlement
under

88.
One need only refer to the huge corpus of human rights law that requires
states to treat their citizens in a particular way. Add to that the development of
universal jurisdiction that gives states the authority to prosecute individuals for
certain crimes committed by anyone anywhere. See Addis, supra note 7, at 130 ("The
availability of universal jurisdiction is, therefore, premised on the presumed effect of
those crimes on humanity as a whole.").
89.

See LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 852 (Robert

Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008) ("[lIt is not for international law but for
the internal law of each state to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered its
national."); see also Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of
Nationality Laws, art. 1, Apr. 13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 ("[I]t is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals.").
90.
The United Nations has consistently declined to embrace the right of
secession as being an aspect of the right to self-determination. See HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 46 (1990) (discussing the bundle of rights associated with the
right to self-determination). But, of course, the United Nations has recognized
secessionist entities as independent states after the fact of successful break from the
larger country (e.g. Bangladesh). This is not a recognition of the right of secession but a
pragmatic acceptance of the political reality. Recently, the International Court of
Justice in the Kosovo advisory opinion declared that there is no prohibition to
unilateral declaration (secession) of independence by a political unit, while not
resolving the issue of whether secession is or can be an aspect of the international law
of self-determination. See generally Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010
I.C.J. 141 (July 22), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf.
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international law. 91 Whether such entitlement exists (and if so, what
would constitute democracy to satisfy the entitlement), the question
goes only to the nature of the institutions to which we the people may
be entitled once constituted, not to how the people will constitute
themselves as an initial matter.
B. The Constitutionof Peoplehoodin an Age of Transition:
The League of Nations and the Dependency Model
There was a time when the relationship between homelands and
diasporas was a concern of the international community and even of
international law-the interwar period (between the two World
Wars). During this period, and under the auspices of the League of
Nations, the international community sought to ensure stability in
Europe by providing for the protection of religious, linguistic, and
ethnic minorities through a series of treaties and unilateral
declarations. 92 A number of new states were required to guarantee
the rights of ethnic and religious minorities before those states were
admitted to the League. The states guaranteed those rights through a

91.

[Dlemocracy is beginning to be seen as the sine qua non for validating
governance.... This newly emerging 'law'-which requires democracy
to validate governance-is not merely the law of a particular state
that, like the United States under its Constitution, has imposed such a
precondition on national governance. It is also becoming a requirement
of international law, applicable to all and implemented through global
standards, with the help of regional and international organizations.
The transformation of the democratic entitlement from moral
prescription to international legal obligation has evolved gradually.

Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46, 46-47 (1992).
A bright line links three generations of democratic entitlement. The
rules and the processes for implementing self-determination, freedom of
discursive expression, and electoral rights, have much in common. They
evidently aim to achieve a coherent purpose: allowing all persons to assume
shared responsibility for shaping the civil society in which they live and work.
Id. at 79.
92.
For a list of treaties, see PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES app. (1991). See also ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK,
JUSTIFICATIONS OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-05 (1997)

(discussing treaties providing for minority protection); LOWE, supra note 87, at 11
("Close attention was paid in the years after the Great War to the treatment of ethnic
minorities within States."); Protectionof Linguistic, Racial and Religious Minorities by
the League of Nations, Provisions Contained in the Various InternationalInstruments
at Present in Force, League of Nations Publications Series, I.B. Minorities, 1927 I.B.2
(1927) (establishing a system for protecting minorities under the guarantee of the
League of Nations).
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series of treaties, mostly bilateral or unilateral declarations. 93 Those
treaties and declarations were not required or dictated by any
provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 94 Indeed, the
Covenant contained no provision for international cooperation for the
protection of minorities, although President Woodrow Wilson
attempted to include a provision requiring the protection of
minorities as a precondition for recognition of the particular
territorial community as a state. 95 The special minorities' treaties
that formed the basis for the protection of minorities under the
auspices of the League originated with the Paris Peace Conference ,96

93.
The minority protection system under the League of Nations was a result of
territorial changes that came about following the Paris Peace Conference. The
protection system included three distinct approaches. One approach was for countries
to join separate treaties with the principal Allied and Associated Powers providing for
the protection of racial, linguistic, and religious minorities. This group included five
countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Greece. A second
approach was to insert provisions on minority protection in the general treaties. This
approach was taken by four countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey. And
still a third approach was for states to make unilateral declarations before the Council
of the League of Nations undertaking obligations to protect minorities within their
borders as a condition of their admission to the League. Albania, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, and Iraq made such declarations. See NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND
DISCRIMINATION

IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

11-12

(1991)

(discussing provisions

on

minority rights incorporated into Austria's, Bulgaria's, Hungary's, and Turkey's peace
treaties, and discussing how Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Iraq "undertook
obligations on the protection of minorities in declarations made before the Council of
the League of Nations").
What make these treaties and declarations international in character are
94.
the fact that they were required as a condition of admission to the League of Nations,
they were to be altered only with the approval of a majority of the League Council, and
any dispute as to their reach and meaning was to be resolved by the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ). Thus, the two pillars of the international system-the
League and the Council-were to act as guarantors of these treaty systems. For
example, the Polish treaty (Minorities in Poland: Treaty Between the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and Poland) provided that any differences of opinion on the
question of law and fact concerning the treaty between Poland and other parties and
members of the Council was to be regarded as an international dispute. Article 14 of
the League's Covenant established the PCIJ to hear and determine disputes that are
referred to it either by the Assembly or the Council. League of Nations Covenant art.
14.
95.
THORNBERRY, supra note 92, at 38. President Wilson's second draft of the
League of Nations Covenant included the following:
The League of Nations shall require all New States to bind themselves
as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous
States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several
jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact,
that is accorded to the racial or national majority of their people.
Id.
96.
Convened in 1919, immediately after WWI, the Paris Peace Conference was
designed to settle disputes through a number of peace treaties with the defeated states,
as well as to map the future through the establishment of the League of Nations.
Asbjorn Eide, The Framework Convention in Historicaland Global Perspective, in THE
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where many minority treaties were signed as part of the various
peace treaties. The Conference also contained a special chapter that
dealt with the issue of minorities in peace treaties. That too formed
the basis for subsequent minority treaties.
Not only were the treaties intended to ensure that religious,
linguistic, and ethnic minorities in these new states were accorded
equal treatment, they were also designed to ensure that those
minorities were able to preserve their "traditions and their national
'' 97
characteristics.
Put simply, ethnic minorities, such as the Greek
minorities in Albania, were viewed by the international community,
to use Walzer's description in another context, as "communities of
character. '98 The major reason for requiring these systems of

RIGHTS OF MINORITIES IN EUROPE: A COMMENTARY ON THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK

CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 25, 33 (Marc Weller ed.,

2005).
97.
Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
64, at 17 (Apr. 6, 1935) [hereinafter Minority Schools in Albania Opinion] (emphasis
added).
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which
differs from them in race, language, or religion, the possibility of living
peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at
the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the
majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs.
In order to attain this object, two things were regarded as particularly
necessary, and have formed the subject of provisions in these treaties.
The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect
equality with the other nationals of the State.
The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for
the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national
characteristics.
These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there would
be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were
deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently compelled to renounce
that which constitutes the very essence of its being as a minority.
Id. (emphasis added).
98.
WALZER, supra note 11, at 62. It was not just Greek minorities that had
protection as communities of character; Greeks in Turkey had a similar protection. In
the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey agreed that "adequate facilities shall be given to
Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech [mostly Greek minorities] for the oral use of
their own languge before the courts"; non-Muslim nationals will be granted "adequate
facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the
children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language"; and
that non-Muslim Turkish nationals will not be "compelled to perform any act which
constitutes a violation of their faith." Treaty of Lausanne, art. 39-43, July 24, 1923, 28
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne]. The treaty provided that the minority
clauses constituted obligations of international concern and were placed under the
guarantee of the League of Nations. They were not to be modified without the consent
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protection as a condition of admission to the League was not the
humanitarian impulse of the League, but rather the desire of
members of the League to minimize armed conflict among nationstates, which members felt would follow if ethnic minorities were not
allowed to retain their "national characteristics." The members of the
League viewed minorities as part of a "nation," part of a "people,"
99
outside the territorial unit in which they found themselves. Their
mistreatment by the government of the territorial state might have
led to intervention by the government of a kin state that viewed itself
1 00
as a guarantor of the welfare and security of those minorities.
Indeed, in many cases, the kin states pleaded the case of the diasporic
minorities before international tribunals and conferences. Thus, for
example, the Greek government raised the issue of Greek minorities
in Albania before the League. 1 1
The minority protection systems of the interwar years were
partly premised on the ambiguous nature of the space occupied by
"the near-abroad" diasporas. The minorities were citizens of the
"hoststate"10 2 and yet the homeland (the kin state) had an interest in
their welfare that it might have been prepared to protect, even
militarily. 10 3 These were not just minorities but "national minorities."

of the majority of the League's Council. Id. art. 44. Any dispute on the law and facts
arising "out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the
other Signatory Powers or any Other power, a member of the Council of the League of
Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations [and may] be referred to the Permanent Court
of International Justice." Id.
The rewriting of the boundaries of Europe had left "approximately twenty99.
five million [people] outside their national homelands." Erin Jenne, National Self
Determination:A Deadly Mobilizing Device, in NEGOTIATING SELF-DETERMINATION 7,
11 (Hurst Hannum & Eileen F. Babbitt, eds. 2006).
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States made the point in a policy100.
setting address. "Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the
world than the treatment which might, in some circumstances be meted out to the
minorities... If this Conference is going to recognise these various Powers as new
sovereignties with defined territories, the chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied
that their territorial elements are of a character to be permanent, and that the
guarantees given are to insure the peace of the world." THORNBERRY, supra note 92, at
40-41 (quoting JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITY TREATIES A FAILURE? 21
(1943)); see also Minority Schools in Albania Opinion, supra note 97, at 7-10 ("[W]hat
the Council of the League of Nations asked Albania to accept, and what Albania did
accept, was a regime of minority protection substantially the same as that which had
been already agreed upon with other States in which there were no "communities.").
See generally Minority Schools in Albania Opinion, supra note 97. The
101.
minorities could not represent themselves as they did not have locus standi.
Indeed, some of the treaties specifically required citizenship for minorities
102.
"with a view of preventing members of minorities from becoming stateless." LERNER,
supra note 93, at 12.
During a debate in the League Assembly in 1933, the German delegate
103.
noted what he thought was an essential truth, the importance of "ethnic nationalism":
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They were not just to be treated equally, but to be allowed to retain
and cultivate their "national characteristics." The minority protection
systems were attempts to reconcile the principle of territorial
sovereignty and the reality of interborder allegiances and loyalties.
To some extent, those arrangements express the ambiguous identity
of we the people.
One could refer to the minority-treaties model as the
Dependency Model. The Dependency Model sees the relationship
between the diaspora and the homeland as one where the government
of the homeland is viewed as the benevolent protector of the kin
living in other, mainly neighboring, countries. The relationship
between diaspora and homeland in this instance is a more or less oneway affair: the homeland as a potential protector of the diaspora's
welfare. 10 4 The treaties stood as surrogates for the homeland in
protecting minorities in the host land, but there was no attempt or
even desire to articulate and protect the stake the diaspora might
have had in the political and cultural life of the homeland. Indeed,
most members of the diaspora never claimed that they had such a
stake. The interwar treaty system, or the Dependency Model, simply
viewed diasporas as dependent on the homeland for providing the
condition to participate fully in the economic and political life of the
"host land," as well as to retain their "traditions and their national
characteristics.'10 5 This is not surprising, because those treaties were
meant to be part of an attempt to ensure international peace and
security, rather than an attempt at defining comprehensively the
diaspora-homeland relationship. They were not even a sustained
attempt at defining the nature of minority rights in the context of an
international system that put a premium on the state system and the
notion of territorial integrity. Interestingly, however, the minority
protection guarantees that states had undertaken were viewed as so
essential to the stability of the territorial arrangements that those
states were required to treat them as fundamental law that could not

The members of a nation or an ethnic group living in a foreign environment
constitute... an organic community ....The very fact that they belong to a
nation means that the nation in question has a natural and moral right to
consider that all its members-even those separated from the mother country
by State frontiers-constitute a moral and cultural whole.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 120, at 23 (1933).

104.
In some sense one could argue that the interwar treaties did assume a twoway affair to the extent that the existence of a patron state was partly thought to be
informed by the active irredentist politics among the diaspora.
105.
See Minority Schools in Albania Opinion, supra note 97, at 11 (emphasis
added) (maintaining that an important reason for the minorities protection system "is
to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for the preservation of their racial
peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics"). The specific issue in
this case was the establishment of private schools by Greeks using the Greek language
as a medium of instruction.
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be derogated by ordinary legislation. Amendments to those
commitments were to be made only with the approval of the Council
of the League of Nations.
As is well known, the minority-protection regime did not endure,
not only because of the collapse of the League system, but also
because of the conceptual tension inherent in the arrangement itself.
The collapse of the regime of minority treaties occurred under the
weight of political as well as conceptual pressures. 10 6 There was
tension between the international community's desire to ensure the
consolidation and stability of the established nation-states (we the
people of the territorial state), on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the protection of distinct and diasporic communities (which in
the view of those nation-states tended to fragment we the people).
The ambiguous nature of we the people-we the people of the
territorial state and we the people of the kin state-was evident in
the minority-treaties system, but it was finally resolved in favor of
the nation-state model of we the people.
Even though there are currently no international institutions or
processes similar to the interwar treaty regime that are designed to
minimize the risk of a kin state intervening on behalf of minorities in
another (often neighboring) state, the notion of a kin state viewing
itself as a patron and guarantor of the security of a diasporic minority
has not entirely disappeared.' 0 7 A good example is Turkey's
intervention on behalf of coethnics in Cyprus in 1974.108 Russia may

106.
One needs to point out that another factor for the demise of the minority
protection system was the fact that it was selectively applied, mainly in Eastern
European countries, and that was viewed as unfair and resented by those who were
subject to the policy. Borhan Uddin Khan & Muhammed Mahbubur Rahman,
Protection of Minorities: A South Asian Discourse, § 2.4 (July 2009), available at
http://www.eurac.edu/enlresearch/institutes/imr/Documents/EURASIA-Net-Dell 7
SouthAsianDiscourse.pdf ("The system of minority protection also lost much of its
legitimacy due to its selective application and its manipulation by Nazi [sic] for its
expansionist policies. Consequently, the issue of minority rights, on the whole, was
seen as damaging, its potential for abuse more pre-eminent than its constructive
faculties.").
107.
The issue of the diaspora being a pretext of state-sponsored irredentism is
another concern if the "diaspora," or the "near-abroad" as it is often referred to,
occupies a territory adjacent to a kin state. See Donald L. Horowitz, Irredentas and
Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections, in IRREDENTISM AND
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 9, 15-16 (Naomi Chazan ed., 1991) (using the example of the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia where Ethiopian Somalis reside and which has often been
used by the state of Somalia to pursue a policy of irredentism); see also MANDELBAUM,
THE NEW EUROPEAN DIASPORA: NATIONAL MINORITIES AND CONFLICT IN EASTERN

EUROPE, supra note 63, at 19-80 (using the Hungarian minority populations as an
example); King & Melvin, supra note 83, at 108 (addressing the question of whether
"transborder ethnic ties can or may increase the insecurity of states").
108.
See WILLIAM MALLINSON, CYPRUS: A MODERN HISTORY 80-83 (2005)
(discussing Turkey's plans to intervene in Cyprus). Serbia played such a role in 1991 in
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provide another example. Russia (or at least some section of its ruling
elite) apparently views itself as a patron and defender of the Russian
diaspora residing in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, a
group that has been referred to as "a stranded minority."' 0 9 Indeed,
the conflict between Russia and Georgia a few years ago was partly
premised on Russia's presumed desire to protect Russians living in
Georgia.11 0 As China increasingly becomes a global power, it may

conflicts involving countries that came out of the former Yugoslavia, especially BosniaHerzegovina.
109.
Smith, supra note 68, at 501 ("Engagement with the literature on diasporic
people, however, suggests that the Russians might be more usefully labeled a 'stranded
minority' rather than a diaspora."); see also id. at 508 ("Russian statists also began to
talk about their 'compatriots abroad' (sootechestvennik) and to argue that the
protection of the rights of such compatriots was now 'one of the fundamental factors of
Russia's foreign policy."'). Charles King and Neil Melvin explain:
From winter 1992 through autumn 1993, a gradual consensus arose
among Russian policy makers that the Russian state was organically linked to
the settler communities and bore responsibility to their well-being, a consensus
that was first crystallized in President Boris Yelstin's decree 'On the Protection
of the Rights and Interests of Russian citizens outside the Russian Federation'
in November 1992.
King & Melvin, supra note 83, at 120. It is interesting that the multiple terms that
Russian officials use to describe their coethnics in countries of the former Soviet Union
shows the rather ambiguous nature of the relationship. They are referred to as 'ethnic
Russians' (russkie), 'citizens of Russia' (grazhdany Rossiiskoi Federatsii),'inhabitants
of Russia' or 'cultural Russians' (rossiiane), 'Russian speakers' (russkoiazychne),
'compatriots' (sootechestuenniki), and even the oxymoronic 'ethnic inhabitants of
Russia' (etnicheskie rossiiane)." See id. at 122. There are indications that though less
assertive and menacing, there are other states which still seek to play some role as the
protector kin state and have concluded bilateral treaties to ensure that their diaspora
are treated well. See id. at 112. Thus, for example, Hungary and Romania have
concluded an agreement that obligates the parties to protect the Romanian and
Hungarian minorities in the territory of the respective countries. See Treaty of
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness, Hung.-Rom., art. 15, Sept. 16,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 340.
110.
According to Reuters, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at
the time that Russia had received reports that villages in South Ossetia, one of the
enclaves seeking secession from Georgia and one with a sizable Russian population,
were being ethnically cleansed. He was reported as having said: "We are receiving
reports that a policy of ethnic cleansing was being conducted in villages in South
Ossetia, the number of refugees is climbing, the panic is growing, people are trying to
save their lives." Conor Sweeney, Russia's Lavrov: South Ossetia "Ethnic Cleansing
Reports," REUTERS, (Aug. 8, 2008, 9:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2008/08/08/us-georgia-ossetia-lavrov-idUSL872256820080808.
Russian
President
Dmitry Medvedev, quoted by the Russian news agency Interfax, said Russians had
died because of Georgia's operations. Russia "will not allow the deaths of our
compatriots to go unpunished" and "those guilty will receive due punishment," he said.
"My duty as Russian president is to safeguard the lives and dignity of Russian citizens,
wherever they are." Helen Womack, Tom Parfitt & Ian Black, Russian Troops and
Tanks Pour Into South Ossetia, GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
worldI2008/aug/09/russia.georgia; see also Russia Resurgent, ECONOMIST, Aug. 16,
2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11920701?story-id=11920701 (noting Russia's
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start flexing its muscles in relation to the Chinese diaspora in various
southeast Asian countries-such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand
and the Philippines-where a sizable Chinese minority lives, often in
tension with the "natives."1'11 The extent to which a kin state, such as
China, may view itself as a protector of fellow ethnics in another
country will, of course, depend on the extent to which those fellow
ethnics are having difficulty integrating into the host state. That is,
the positive feeling on the side of the diaspora for ethnic and cultural
solidarity with the homeland is often heightened by the negative
condition of nonacceptance or unequal treatment of the diaspora on
the part of the host land. 112 As discussed later in some detail, Israel's
desire to protect the Jewish diaspora goes even further than any
country has gone by asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction to
criminally sanction anyone who has committed an offense against
"the life, body, health, freedom or property of a Jew, as a Jew, or the
113
property of a Jewish institution, because it is such."
To some extent, current international human rights law has
taken up the cause of the cultural and national minorities that the
interwar treaties attempted to deal with. Nation-states are prohibited
from denying those minorities the right to retain and cultivate their
culture, heritage, and religious commitments.1 4 But the protection of
minorities under current human rights law is not premised on what a
kin state would do were these minorities not protected. Put simply,
current human rights law regimes that protect minorities as groups

perfunctory attempt to justify the invasion on the ground that it was defending
Russian citizens).
111.
See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 36 (2003). It is
interesting to note that the persecution of Chinese diasporic communities in southeast
Asia as well as other places has apparently been viewed historically as an attempt to
humiliate China, and consequently the treatment of the diaspora has been "used as a
symbolic resource for the continued production of Chinese national identity." Ogden,
supra note 83, at 3 (citing William A. Callahan, Beyond Cosmopolitanism and
Nationalism: DiasporicChinese and Neo-Nationalism in China and Thailand, 57 INT'L
ORG. 481, 493 (2003)). The size of the Chinese minority in southeast Asia varies from a
high of about 35 percent in Malaysia down to less than 10 percent in Cambodia and
Laos. Of course, Singapore has a Chinese majority (about 75 percent).
112.
The requirement in the Baltic states that people of Russian descent learn
the local language to be accorded full citizenship was an example of processes that
were meant to, or at least had the effect of, making a group unwanted by the host land.
See Annelies Lottmann, Note, No DirectionHome: Nationalism and Statelessness in the
Baltics, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 503, 507 (2008) (requiring rigorous examinations of
nonnative speakers attempting to undergo the naturalization process).
113.
Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 13(b)(2) (1977) (Isr.).
114.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 27 ("In those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.").
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are not concerned about the relationship between kin states and
diasporic minorities. 115
To summarize, although the interwar minority-treaties regime
could be said to be one of the earliest attempts by international law to
deal with the ambiguous nature of the traveling notion of peoplehood,
and even though the notion of the kin state as protector of the
interest of coethnics in neighboring countries may currently exist in
parts of the globe, the Dependency Model does not fully capture the
issues that are raised by the nature of modern day diasporahomeland relationships. This is so for a number of reasons. First, the
Dependency Model embodied in the minority-treaties systems
described, and worried about, only one side of the relationship-the
kin state's attitude toward coethnics and its actions regarding their
welfare. The inquiry never addressed whether coethnics have any
stake in the homeland. Indeed, unlike modern diasporas, the
diasporas of the "near abroad" never left their land, although the
border might have moved. Therefore, the idea of participating in the
life of the "former homeland" is not a significant or pressing issue for
them.
Second, the issue of who is allowed to define we the people that
encompasses the homeland and the diaspora, which has been the
point of contention among modern diasporas and many governments
of homelands, did not figure into the Dependency Model. The
Dependency Model entertained a weak notion of peoplehood, while
modern diasporas seek a stronger or thicker version where there is a
sharing, or at least an aspiration, of collective agency between the
diaspora and the people of the homeland.

115.
There is, however, an arrangement that seems to be reminiscent of the
process of the interwar period. In 1990 the European Union adopted a declaration
setting out the criteria that member states would apply to determine when and
whether a new state ought to be recognized. One of those criteria was how a state
treated its minorities. The conditions in Europe in the 1990s were similar to those that
prevailed immediately after WWI. In the same way that new states were emerging out
of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 1990s saw the collapse of the
USSR and Yugoslavia leading to the establishment of many new states with
substantial ethnic minorities from bordering states. The same sorts of concerns that led
to the interwar treaty system seemed to have led to the adoption of the declarations of
state recognition by the European Union and the proliferation of "interstate treaties on
good neighborly relations [that] regularly include a provision acknowledging the
signatories' reciprocal interests in their cultural diasporas in neighboring states." King
& Melvin, supra note 83, at 112. For an example of such a treaty see Treaty of
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness, supra note 109. Article 15 of
the Treaty deals exclusively with the reciprocal duties of the two countries toward each
other's ethnic minorities within their boundaries. Id. art. 15.
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C. The Constitutionof Peoplehood: The CommunitarianModel
As noted in the last subpart, although there are some hints that
the Dependency Model may inform policy choices on rare occasions, it
currently neither captures the reality of the modern-day relationship
between diasporas and homelands nor suggests a normatively
defensible theory of peoplehood in light of that relationship. It cannot
describe the relationship accurately, for it does not capture the twoway nature of the relationship and the desire of members of the
diaspora to actively participate in the economic and political life of
the homeland, rather than simply receiving security guarantees. It
does not paint a normatively desirable picture because, to the extent
that dealing with the relationship between diasporas and homelands
is seen as a matter of minimizing interstate conflict, it does not help
explain the multiple ways in which communities are constituted,
people are imagined, and identities are vindicated. The diasporahomeland relationship is about how communities form across
territorial boundaries in the age of the communication revolution and
globalization generally.
The rest of the Article explores both the nature of communities
(and peoplehood) that the relationship between diaspora and
homeland suggests, and how consistent such communities and
peoples are with the demands of democratic legitimacy and just
political institutions.
1.

The Issue of Community Deferred (Unaddressed)

The relationship between diaspora and homeland can often be
mutually supportive and highly beneficial. For the diaspora, the
homeland can become a source of cultural and identity reinforcement
and sometimes even a guarantor of security. 116 For the government of
the homeland, the diaspora can often serve as a source of financial
support (remittance and investment), 117 as well as an important

116.
See Shain & Barth, supranote 65, at 451.
117.
See Okonjo-Iweala & Ratha, supra note 72. Diaspora investments take
various forms-from direct investment to the purchase of diaspora bond ("a retail
saving instrument marketed only to migrants"). Id. Many countries, many in the
developing world, have used the selling of bonds to their diaspora as a means of raising
needed capital to finance projects within the homeland. The bonds could be sold in as
small a denomination as $100, thus allowing many members of the diaspora to
participate. They can be sold "globally to diaspora groups through national and
international banks and money transfer companies. They can be marketed through
churches, community groups, ethnic newspapers, stores, and business associations in
places where migrants live in large numbers." Id. The concept of diaspora bonds is not
new, although it did not get wide use until recently. Israel has used it since 1951 to get
support for developmental projects from the Jewish diaspora, mainly in the United
States and Canada. India has utilized the system since 1991 to great effect. See
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lobbying group within host lands in support of the homeland (in
terms of foreign aid and other general foreign policy issues)." i 8 As
long as the diaspora plays a supporting role, it remains useful and
congenial to the government and authorities of the homeland. The
issue of who is a legitimate member of the political community (the
homeland) need not be (and is not) addressed. Each group is left to
understand its relationship with the other in its own way.
To be sure, the relationship is not left entirely unaddressed.
Some countries grant dual or plural citizenship to members of their
diaspora, 119 but there is no general expectation or requirement that
they do so in relation to all members. 12 0 Put simply, to be part of we
the people, it is not sufficient that one claims to be or is a member of
the diaspora. One has to be admitted through the traditional ritual of
citizenship or residency. Some countries, such as India and Ethiopia,
have accorded their diasporas (selectively in the case of Ethiopia) a
status that gives them better access than other foreigners to
opportunities in the economic life of the country (to invest). 12 1 This

Chander, supra note 28, at 1013. Other countries, such as Ethiopia, have issued
diaspora bonds but with little success "in mobilizing funds." See Okonjo-Iweala &
Ratha, supra note 72. There are a number of reasons for the lack of success of these
bonds-from perception of high political risk and economic uncertainty to limited
marketing and publicity to diaspora opposition to the government to power. These
certainly seem to have been the factors that diminished the chance of success in
relation to Ethiopian bonds.
118.
Sometimes, the homeland may use the diaspora to undermine the
government of the host land.
119.

See Nicholas Wood, Croatia's Prime Minister Looks for Votes from Croats

Living in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A6 ("An estimated 300,000 ethnic
Croats live here, and anyone claiming Croatian ethnicity is allowed to vote."). For a
number of other countries that afford dual nationality see Thomas M. Franck, Clan
and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L

L. 359, 380 (1996) (discussing the changing attitudes of various countries to allow for
dual citizenship); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 19, at 28 ("The rising incidence of
dual citizenship is also due to the growing number of countries that have altered their
laws to permit their citizens to retain nationality despite naturalization elsewhere.");
Chander, supra note 4, at 69 (stating that over the past ten years the Philipines,
Mexico, and India have all begun offering a form of dual citizenship); Sejersen, supra
note 50, at 534 ("[Flrom a limited number of countries in the 1950s, currently almost
half of the 115 countries analyzed here allow dual citizenship.").
120.
The one exception is the Israeli Law of Return. See Law of Return, 57101950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.) ("An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has
expressed his desire to settle in Israel."). International law of course leaves the issue of
citizenship (its acquisition and its maintenance) to states' discretion, but it seems to
disfavor the practice of dual citizenship. Thus, the preamble to the Hague Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws holds: "it is in the
interest of the international community to secure that all members should recognize
that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only."
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
pmbl., Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
121.
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 4, at 72.
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extension of opportunities does not, however, deal with the question
of whether members of the diaspora are part of we the people of the
homeland, such that it is not for the government to "give or deny"
that right of membership. The grant of the favorable permits to
members of the diaspora is based not on any sense of members of the
diaspora being part of the political community, but rather because
diasporas are thought to be more likely than other outsiders to be
interested in investing in the country. l2 2 Therefore, special permits
act as incentives and encouragements to those adjudged likely to
invest in the country. Of course, the assumption that diasporas are
more likely to invest than other foreigners contains its own implicit
judgment about the closeness of the relationship between diaspora
and homeland.
2.

The Issue of Community Joined: When Relationships Sour

The relationships between diasporas and the government of the
homeland can also be one of mutual suspicion and antagonism. Two
factors inform this suspicion and antagonism: the differing images of
the homeland each carries and the level of involvement by members
of the diaspora in homeland affairs considered proper or tolerable.
The divisions are, therefore, often over whose vision (image) of
homeland will prevail.
In the Ethiopian context, for example, there has been serious
division between members of the diaspora and the government in
power about the proper vision for the country. 12 3 Is the country well-

In 1999, India introduced the possibility of being a card-carrying
member of its diaspora. Upon the payment of a fee, anyone who was formerly
an Indian citizen or who was the child, grandchild, or great-grandchild of
Indian citizens, can become a "Person of Indian Origin" (PIO). According to the
Indian government, "besides making their journey back to their roots simpler,
easier, and smoother, this Scheme entitles, the PIOs to a wide range of
economic, financial, educational and cultural benefits."

Id.
See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an
122.
Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 36 (2006) ("In embracing nationals abroad,
at least symbolically and rhetorically, emigration states anticipate that emigrants will
invest at home economically."). Similar processes exist in relation to Ethiopia.
123.
There are numerous Ethiopian diaspora organizations both in the United
States and other developed countries (mainly in Western Europe, Canada, and
Australia) that challenge the democratic credential as well as specific policies of the
current government. Many of these groups have essentially taken the role of opposition
parties in a context where the role of opposition (both political and civic) within the
country is highly controlled. The relationship between the Ukrainian government of
Leonid Kravchuk and the Ukrainian diaspora turned sour during the 1990s after
Ukraine's independence because the diaspora had such a different image of the course
the country should follow from that of the government that it (especially the western
diaspora) was viewed as a "threat to the interests of local politicians and entrenched
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served by ethnic federalism? Should part of the country (Eritrea)
have been allowed to secede without the entire population of the
country being given the chance to express its view on the matter?
Was the government acting in the interest of the country when it
accepted the landlocked status of the country, without even a
semblance of involving the people in the discussion and decision?
While the Ethiopian diaspora charges that decisions such as these
cast doubt on the commitment of the government to advance the
welfare of the nation, the government argues that the resistance of
the diaspora to these policies is based, among other things, on a
romanticized and often very dated and erroneous image of the
country. On this account, the diaspora is viewed as unwisely clinging
to an image of a homeland that never was (or perhaps never should
have been). These very questions-whether changes have benefitted
the homeland and who has the authority to effect those changescause the divisions among diasporas and homeland governments.
Interestingly, often the diaspora's challenge to the homeland's
government on the question of which direction the country should
take is premised on the notion that the diaspora does in fact
represent the wishes and preferences of the citizens of the country,
which are not fully (if at all) represented by the government in power.
In some circumstances the decision of the government of the
homeland may affect the diaspora much more directly. Thus, for
example, if the Armenian government were to conclude a bilateral
agreement with Turkey on the condition that the Armenian
government accept the proposition that no genocide was committed
by the Ottoman Empire, that will affect not only Armenians within
Armenia but the Armenian diaspora as well. For the Armenian
diaspora, the central defining features of Armenian history are the
1915 massacre, regarded by them and many others as a genocide, and
the forced deportations, both of which they believe were orchestrated
by the Turks. 124 In this sense, the question of who is getting involved

economic elites," and President Kravchuk threatened to "expel diaspora returnees who
were critical of the government." King & Melvin, supra note 83, at 124. During the
Soviet years, the Ukrainian diaspora was a powerful lobby on behalf of Ukraine and
Ukraine's independence.
124.
See SHAIN, supra note 10, at 120 ("To the extent that an Armenian
rapprochement with Turkey requires deemphasizing the genocide issue, for example, it
threatens the identity of diaspora Armenians."); see also Shain & Barth, supra note 65,
at 466-73 ("While the genocide was the most central issue to the diaspora's identity
and its organizational agenda, it was less important to the homeland community [i.e.
the Armenian state], which for the most part had escaped the trauma."). Thus, when
President Ter-Petrossian of the Armenian Republic advocated opening up to Turkey
and establishing "normal" relations, that policy became highly controversial among the
diaspora who viewed it as downplaying the significance of the genocide. Id. at 469.
Indeed, Ter-Petrossian
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in whose affairs becomes a lot more complicated. One can argue that
to the extent the government of the homeland is attempting to write
or rewrite the history of the entire community, it is not simply
diasporic involvement that is at issue, but also the involvement of the
homeland government in diasporic affairs. Here, the diaspora's
interest does not depend on whether it reflects the interest of citizens
within the homeland. The diaspora has an independent interest that
it wishes to protect from the government's action. 125 The diaspora has
an independent stake.
To summarize, suspicion and conflict between the homeland
government and the diaspora occur over the image each has of both
the historical and the current homeland. Each may view the other as
insufficiently loyal to the homeland and its history, and each may
seek to vindicate and protect that image through various policies.
Those strategies may, and often do, come into conflict. Of course,
there are conflicts about the future and identity of the homeland even
among those within the homeland. But two factors distinguish those
controversies from controversies between the diaspora and the
authorities of the homeland. First, the government treats opposition
within the homeland as a legitimate voice that needs to be taken into
account and responded to (at least in minimally democratic states).
However, it does not view the complaints of members of the diaspora
in the same way it views complaints by those residing within the
homeland-as complaints of the people. Second, formal institutional
mechanisms exist to resolve, or at least manage, disputes among the
members of the territorial political community about the future and
identity of the homeland. No similar institutions have been

lost standing among diasporic sympathizers for underestimating the risk of
another genocide without fundamental changes in the policies of Turkey and
Azerbaijan. In the face of these domestic, international, and intrakin failures,
Ter-Petrossian was ultimately forced to resign in 1998. By many accounts, the
diaspora was highly instrumental in his removal.
See SHAIN, supra note 10, at 148.
125.
A report about a proposed law by the Israeli Knesset a few years ago (which
passed first reading) according to which "conversions performed in Israel would be
recognized only if performed by Orthodox rabbis," is another example. See Chaim Gans,
National Self-Determination: A Sub- and Inter-Statist Conception, 13 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 185, 195 (2000). Gans notes:
Since many Jews living outside Israel do not adhere to the Orthodox version of
the Jewish religion, this particular Knesset decision offended many Jews who
are not Israeli citizens and who can't participate in this debate or any other
decisions of this sort. If the issue were only related to Jewish life within Israel,
and to issues of identity resulting from the special status of homeland in
national identities, Jews living outside Israel might have had no case for
complaining. However, the decision in question is not of this type.
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established to entertain, evaluate, and resolve the differences
between the diaspora and the homeland's government. Neither
international legal principles nor national institutional structures
exist to deal with those disputes and differences.
As diasporas seek to play a more direct and prominent role in the
political processes of their homelands, and as the communication
revolution makes it easier for that to happen, the tension between
diasporas and authorities of the homelands will continue to intensify,
especially when their visions for the homeland collide. As a RAND
study shows, in the post-Cold War era, governmental support of
insurgencies has declined sharply, and diasporas have become a
major source of that support. 126 The questions of who we the people
are, who should legitimately establish and modify (or alter) "our"
government and our institutions, and who should define the identity
of the homeland are squarely joined. The boundaries demarcating
127
membership, belonging, and exclusion become highly contested.
For what purpose is the diaspora included, and for what purpose is it
not? For what purpose is the diaspora part of "us," the homeland, and
for what purpose is it "them," the foreigner, the outsider? Put simply,
what is the appropriate relationship between the diaspora and the
political community called homeland? That is, what relationship is
consistent with a version of democratic process where we the people
originate the rules and institutions under which they live and
through which they express and project themselves to the outside
world. At bottom, the dividing issue becomes who has the ability to
define the political community called homeland and to write its
formal history in the public arena.
3.

The Contest to Define We the People

As noted earlier, the contest between diasporas and governments
of homelands focuses on how communities are to be constituted and
how the notion of we the people is to be understood.

126.

See DANIEL BYMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT

MOVEMENT 41 (2001) ("Diasporas-immigrant communities established in other
countries-frequently support insurgencies in their homelands."). A good example is
the Haitian diaspora, which, as one observer put it, has played a central role "in
engineering coups d'ktat-with the help of one or more foreign governments." Laguerre,
supra note 55, at 207; see also Walt Bogdanich & Jenny Nordberg, Mixed U.S. Signals
Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al (discussing the
relationship between Washington officials and the Haitian coup).
127.
BRAH, supra note 59, at 208-09. Avtar Brah defines "diasporic space" as
"the point at which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness,
of 'us' and 'them', are contested." Id.
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Governments of homelands that are targeted by diasporas often
assert that, for all practical purposes, diasporas are foreigners and
their attempt to involve themselves in the political and economic life
of the country without the permission of the legitimate government
and at variance with its policies and objectives is an impermissible
interference, both as a matter of international law and according to
principles of democracy. The legal principle of self-determination of
peoples captures both the idea of international rule of law and the
principle of democracy. 128 Self-determination is about selfgovernment, and self-government is a reality only to the extent that
people originate the rules and institutions that will govern their
lives. 129 Democracy conceives of an identity between the ruled and
the originators of the rules. As Jtirgen Habermas argues, in a
democratic state "citizens are autonomous only if the addressees of
the law can also see themselves as its authors."130 Of course, only a
128.
The notion of self-determination of peoples is listed as one of the primary
purposes of the United Nations. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (stating that one of the
"[p]urposes of the United Nations" is "respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples"); see also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25,
1993, Vienna Declarationand Programmeof Action, 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law]; Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp No. 28, A/8028, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970) ("The
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of selfdetermination by that people."); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
2 (Dec. 14, 1960) ("All peoples have the right to self16, A/4684, at 66-67,
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."). The Declaration on
Principles of International Law declared that the right of self-determination
shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people.
Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra.
129.
See BRUNKHORST, supra note 23, at 68-77 (proclaiming that legitimate
modern democracy requires legal obligations to be self-imposed rather than externally
dictated such that the people represent themselves and are not being represented by a
ruler).
JIRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
130.
THEORY 215 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo de Greiff eds., 1998); see also BENHABIB, supra
note 14, at 217 ("[T]hose who are subject to the law should also be its authors."); JAMES
BOHMAN, DEMOCRACY ACROSS BORDERS: FROM DtMOS TO Dt MoI 29 (2007). A
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few of the addressees will be the literal authors of the law, but the
idea is that the literal authors receive their general instruction from
all addressees and remain accountable to them in regard to the rules
adopted.
Given that diasporas live outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the homeland, the argument goes, their involvement in the political
and economic life of the homeland without the permission of the duly
constituted government of the homeland is a clear violation of the
internationally recognized principle of self-determination. For the
notion of community that puts a premium on territory and
citizenship, the "we" who constitutes the legitimate originators of the
laws and institutions of the political community does not include
former members of the political community who have left the
territory, either voluntarily or otherwise, to make a life for
themselves elsewhere. Decampers cannot (and should not) be allowed
to exercise direct influence over the nature of the political community
they "elected" to abandon or refused to rejoin (or join for the first
time). According to this view, not only are diasporas physically absent
from the spheres of deliberation, but, in most circumstances, they
also have dual loyalty: loyalty to homeland and loyalty to host land.
To recap, the statist challenge to the "uninvited" involvement of
the diaspora in the life of the political community is informed by the
proposition that self-determination would be compromised to the
extent that those outside the territorial entity could affect policies
and institutions that only bind citizens and residents of the territorial
unit. A process that allows those outside the territorial unit to play a
role in determining policies and establishing institutions for others,
without any serious risk to themselves were these choices to turn out
to be wrong or suboptimal, is one that is likely to lead to decisions
that are not well considered. In addition, there is the risk that most
members of the diaspora do not have much appreciation of the
condition of the homeland and the daily lives of their compatriots.
Many may have lived for a considerable length of time in other
countries and cultures, and the image they hold of the homeland may
not be congruent with the current reality of life. Under those
circumstances, they would likely base decisions and interventions on
erroneous assumptions.

legitimate order is one that is a "self-legislation demos, of citizens ruling and being
ruled in return ... consisting of all those and only those who are full citizens and thus
both authors and subjects of the law." Id.
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Those who consider members of the diaspora to be a legitimate
part of we the people of the homeland are likely to respond to the
statist challenge in various ways. Contrary to the argument that
intervention uninvited by, or against the wishes of, the government of
the homeland is inconsistent with the idea of self-determination; the
truth is that often it is when there is a lack of internal selfdetermination that diasporas assume the role of the opposition. For
example, in the case of Ethiopia, it is in the context of the suppression
of dissent and the imprisonment of opposition leaders that members
of the diaspora have actively challenged successive governments of
the homeland. In this sense, diasporas provide voices for the voiceless
and perhaps contribute to the conditions for the emergence of a
genuine process of self-determination. The conversations that are not
allowed to go on in the country about the conditions of the country
and about alternatives can be aired and discussed largely due to the
energetic involvement of the diaspora. In relation to many developing
countries that are ruled by brutal dictators and are not of any
strategic interest to the big powers (or if those dictators are seen to be
useful strategic allies), the voice of members of the diaspora is the
only voice of challenge to those dictatorships-both in terms of
articulating the hopes and concerns of people in the homeland and
lobbying governments of the host land to put pressure on the
government of the homeland. In any case, many of the members of
those diasporas left their homeland because they were victims of that
lack of internal self-determination.
The argument that genuine deliberations could only be
conducted within a territorial unit is also open to challenge. 131 In an
age of instant and worldwide communication, deliberation can take
place even among people separated by oceans and territorial borders.
In any case, even in relation to deliberation within territorial units,
the mass media mediate a great deal of public deliberation.
Communities of communication can be constituted across national
boundaries, as they can be within territorial boundaries. Indeed, in
many cases, the active intervention of diasporas might help
communities of communication develop within the homeland itself.

David Martin makes the argument that restricting voting of dual nationals
131.
only in the country in which they reside will promote "mature deliberation and
seriousness about the vote, because the voter will have to live with the consequences in
the most direct way." David A. Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a
Democratizing Globe: Between Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 26
(2000).
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There is some merit to the argument that members of the
diaspora are far removed from the daily life of residents of the
homeland. Many members may have lived outside of the homeland
for so long that the image of the homeland they hold, and on the basis
of which they make decisions, tends to be incongruent with current
conditions. The power of that argument, however, is somewhat
blunted by the fact that instant and constant communications have
made it easier for people across national boundaries to learn about
conditions in other political units. In fact, in some circumstances the
diaspora may have more accurate information about conditions in the
homeland than residents, for governments of many of the countries in
relation to which the diasporas are actively opposed tend to control
the means of communication and discourage the dissemination of
132
diverse information.
Perhaps the statist's strongest argument is that the democratic
principle of identitary self-legislation 133 will have been violated, to
the extent the rules and institutions advocated by diasporas will end
up applying to others (residents of the territorial community) and not
to members of the diaspora themselves. It is true that members of the
diaspora live in other countries and are subject to the laws and
institutions of those countries. Their interventions in homeland
affairs could thus be said to be immune from the costs those
interventions might entail. 134 But it can be argued that the rules,
policies, and regulations that are intended to apply to the homeland
are not entirely without effect on the diaspora. To begin with, some
members of diasporas still retain their citizenship-perhaps the most

132.
The Ethiopian government, which has closed access to many websites
because they were viewed as challenges to the power of the regime, is a good example
of the value of diasporic involvement for the purpose of broadening the sources of
information for an effective deliberative process. The argument that emphasizes the
need for physical presence in the territory as an important condition of genuine
deliberation is undermined to the extent that governments allow their citizens that
reside abroad, either on a temporary basis or on a more permanent assignment, to
participate in the election process (as some do),.
133.
For the proposition that democracy entails an identity between the ruled
and the originators of the rules, see BRUNKHORST, supra note 23, at 74 ("Minimizing
domination through a 'rule by the ruled' that supersedes domination is the highest
constitutional task in democracy."). See also JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 458

(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) ("[T]he only regulations and ways of acting that
can claim legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as
participants in rational discourses."); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67, 67

(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (defining deliberative democracy as "an
association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members").
134.
See Michael Ignatieff, Immigration: The Hate Stops Here, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Oct. 25, 2001, at A17 ("Diaspora nationalism is a dangerous phenomenon because it is
easier to hate from a distance: You don't have to live with the consequences-or the
reprisals.").
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visible indication of wishing to retain ties with the homeland. 135 In
some cases, members of diasporas may have dual citizenship.' 3 6 In
addition, members of the diasporas accept the risks of investing in
their former homeland not simply (or even primarily) because they
think that these investments will lead to good returns, but because
they are committed to the development of their homeland. Financial
contributions and investments, whether direct investment or the
purchasing of diaspora bonds, 137 are partly (perhaps primarily) about
protecting and strengthening the identity of the homeland. It follows
then that diasporas have a stake in the rules and regulations that are
developed and adopted.
Also, to the extent that many diasporas define their identities
through the cultural and historical life of the homeland, actions that
affect that history and culture also affect members of the diaspora.
The cultures, traditions, and histories of the homeland sustain not
only those inside the homeland but also those in the diaspora. Thus,
for example, a policy of the Israeli government may have
1 38
consequences not only for Israelis but also for the Jewish diaspora.
A treaty between the Armenian government and the government of
Turkey that included a provision denying genocide against
Armenians clearly has an impact not only on citizens of Armenia but
on the Armenian diaspora as well, to the extent that their history and
self-understanding were officially altered by a government that
appears to speak on behalf of all Armenians. There are numerous,
though perhaps less stark, examples of a decision of the homeland
that has an impact on the identity of members of the diaspora. Thus,
for example, a decision of the Ethiopian government to divide the
135.
And most countries extend the voting franchise broadly to citizens living
abroad. See Peter J. Spiro, Perfecting Political Diaspora, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 211
(2006) ("Although many states restrict the franchise of nonresidents, the clear trend is
towards allowing and facilitating greater electoral participation by external citizens.").
Spiro has recently argued that dual citizenship should be considered a human right.
See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 111
(2010).
136.
See, e.g., Sejersen, supra note 50, at 530 (discussing the evolving global
attitude toward allowing for dual citizenship); Wood, supra note 119, at A6 ("An
estimated 300,000 ethnic Croats live here, and anyone claiming Croatian ethnicity is
allowed to vote.").
137.
See Chander, supra note 28, at 1060. The "patriotic" discount (a higher
than market price) at which these bonds are sold to the diaspora and the diaspora's
willingness to pay supports the hypothesis that the investment is primarily driven by
loyalty to the homeland and the desire to help it than by sound investment. For the
homeland the offer of these bonds at a lower than market interest rate (which is
essentially a charity) saves them from asking an outright charity from the diaspora,
which might be regarded as politically demeaning. And it is also the case that diaspora
bonds, rather than outright charity, will have a favorable impact on a country's
sovereign credit rating. See id. at 1067-69.
138.
See, e.g., Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.) (granting
citizenship to all members of the diaspora that desire to reside in Israel).
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country into two nations-Ethiopia and Eritrea-drastically altered
how some members of the diaspora saw themselves and their very
identities. One was no longer an Ethiopian but an Eritrean, even if
his or her kin lived just across the border. If one resided in the part
that was denominated as Ethiopia, one was not to see Eritrea as
being part of one's history and heritage. The same thing could be said
about the effect of the government's strategy of organizing Ethiopia
into ethnic states. Even more relevantly, some members of the
current government waged a huge campaign for the first few years of
their reign, both within and outside the country, to disparage
13 9
Ethiopia's history.
To recap, the democratic theory of the rules of the ruled does not
entirely undermine the claim by members of the diaspora to a right to
participate in the economic and political life of the homeland. After
all, as argued earlier, they too are likely to be affected by the rules
and institutions that emerge within the political community. They too
are often addressees of those rules and regulations, and consequently,
they too belong to we the people. It may also be useful to point out
that members of the diaspora contribute a great deal to the economic
life of many poor developing countries through remittances. Those
governments' economic policies are likely to have some impact on
members of their diaspora.
Even if the claim that only citizens are the legitimate originators
of the rules and institutions of the political community is consistent
with some version of democratic theory, it certainly will be at odds
with the reality of cross-border participation that has become a
feature of social and political life in this globalized world. Because of
the communication revolution, diasporas will remain part of the
political dialogue about the homeland, and they will do so with
increasing ease and greater impact. To disregard this would be to live
in a fantasyland. The issue is not whether members of the diaspora
should be allowed to participate in the political, economic, and social
life of the homeland. They will. Rather, the question is what are the
best conceptual and institutional ways of understanding and
facilitating this participation?

139.
At national and international meetings, high-ranking officials made it a
point to remind audiences that Ethiopia was not older than a hundred years, even
though historians have shown that the history of the country extends for thousands of
years and that history has defined the identity of the nation and its citizens. For the
history of the country, see HAGGAI ERLICH, ETHIOPIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (1994)

("[T]he kingdom of Aksum, the first stage of today's Ethiopia, emerged in the first
century A.D."). See also DONALD N. LEVINE, GREATER ETHIOPIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY 33-36 (1974).
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IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION:

AN INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY OF THE
AFFECTED (STAKEHOLDERS)

Three factors determine whether there is a people in the era of
global communication. The first factor is whether common narratives
of origin and fate tie together those who consider themselves part of
the people. 140 Physical territory does not exhaust the boundaries of a
community, as William Connolly explained.1 4 1 Second, members of a
people subject themselves to the same or similar consequences of
institutional action as other members. That is, a community is
defined not only in terms of the narratives that members share but
also in terms of the common institutions they inhabit-political,
religious, or cultural. And members open themselves up to the effects
of institutional decisions, whether good or bad. To put it differently,
members feel special and personal links (responsibilities) to one
another through the institutions they inhabit or share. 14 2 The first

A people is a "social fact of common sentiments, shared language, culture,
140.
and religion that lead individuals to form bonds of solidarity." Applbaum, supra note
53, at 374. This is what Applbaum calls anthropological sense of peoplehood. See id.;
NATIONALISM,
IN
THE VERNACULAR:
POLITICS
see also
WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 319-20 (2001) ("People belong to the same
community of fate if they care about each other's fate, and want to share each other's
fate-that is, want to meet certain challenges together, so as to share each other's
blessings and burdens.").
141.
See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 163 (1995)
(discussing how "points of affinity among citizens residing in different states establish
new possibilities for political movements exceeding the boundaries of any particular
state"). Territory may be the beginning but not the entire definer of a people. Rainer
Baubbck is correct when he notes that:
A nation may need a territory, where its culture and tradition is sustained by
state institutions, in order to survive as a distinct community .... Yet, once
such a homeland has been established as an independent state, the nation can
reach beyond its borders and include individuals who are seen to belong to it by
virtue of their ethnic descent or cultural affiliations.
Baub6ck, supra note 22, at 2414. So, when I note that territory does not exhaust the
boundaries of community, I simply mean to suggest that distinct public culture rather
than physical territory distinguishes a people from one another in the way I define
people. For a similar understanding of communities, see DAVID MILLER, ON
NATIONALITY 27 (1995) (defining community by "[(1)] shared belief and mutual
commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a
particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public
culture").
142.
Ronald Dworkin uses a similar but not exact description in the account he
gives of what constitutes a community. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 199
(1986); see also Adeno Addis, Authority and Community, 18 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 63, 63-72
(2010) (discussing how members of a community will regard the obligations which exist
within the group as distinctive to that group).
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and second factors could collectively be referred to as the "affectivity"
criterion.143
Third, legitimacy in the twenty-first century requires that the
people are the originators of the rules and institutions that regulate
their lives and activities. Hauke Brunkhorst calls this "identitary
self-legislation. '144 The rules are the rules of the ruled. This assumes
a "community of equals," to borrow a phrase. 145 While the first factor
is anthropological, the last two are normative to the extent that they
concern the capacity of a people for shared agency-either directly or
through established institutions.
The above three factors interconnect. The narratives of origin
and fate can only be fully disseminated and understood within
common institutions (at least imagined common institutions), and the
idea of identitary self-legislation assumes that the people act as a
corporate (group) agent 146 to originate rules through common
institutions. That is, shared agency assumes shared institutions.
Loosening the tight link between territory and community and
thinking of communities as capable of being constituted across
physical boundaries also indicates that, contrary to the notion of an
all-purpose community and peoplehood that physical boundaries have
often suggested, communities and peoples are capable of being
defined differently for different
purposes. 14 7 However, to
deterritorialize the notion of community is not to collapse it to the
rather extravagant claim of an all-inclusive international community

143.
See List & Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 37, at 81 (stating that the
affectivity criterion may be "defined by underlying cultural commonalities and a shared
identity, at least with regards to the given issues").
144.

BRUNKHORST, supra note 23, at 140; see also HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS

AND NORMS, supranote 133, at 458 ("[T]he only regulations and ways of acting that can
claim legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as
participants in rational discourses.").
145.
See FISS, supra note 19. Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point when he
argues that one of the factors that constitute a community is that members believe that
the group's practices embody an equal concern for all the members of the group. For
Dworkin, therefore, a community is "conceptually egalitarian." DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 142, at 200. The "roles and rules are equally in the interests of all,
that no one's life is more important than anyone else's." Id. at 200-01.
146.
By "corporate (group) agent" I mean what Christian List and Mathias
Koeing-Archibugi meant when they define "group agent" as "a collection of individuals
that meets the conditions of agency, that is, roughly speaking, it has attitudes on the
issues it faces and acts so as to pursue those attitudes [i.e. beliefs and preferences]."
List & Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 37, at 91.
147.
Here I am making a point analogous to that Ian Shapiro made when he
remarked that the notion of affected interests requires that we define "the demos
decision by decision rather than people by people." IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 222 (2003). We may not agree with Shapiro that every
decision defines the demos, but his general point that stakeholding is an important
way of defining the demos is eminently reasonable.
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(global peoplehood) that some cosmopolitans regard as the only
148
natural alternative to territorial communities.
A. The Diasporaand a Common Narrative of Origin and Fate
By now it should be clear that the relationships between
diasporas and homelands are defined by narratives of origin and
fate-backward and forward-looking. The boundary that ties together
diasporas and homelands is not a physical boundary, but rather
narratives of origin and common fate. One can easily see the origin
aspect of the narrative. Diasporas link their histories to the land and
people of the homeland. But the relationship is also defined by a
common fate (forward-looking), one that is partly cultivated by the
actions of governments of the homelands, as well as the actions of
diasporas themselves. The narrative of fate distinguishes between the
relationship of modern diasporas and homelands, on the one hand,
and the relationship that existed between diasporas and homelands
of earlier periods. While the narrative of origin is common to both
periods, the idea of common fate is distinctly (or largely) a product of
the modern world of instant and effective communication. One only
needs to browse the various websites linking diasporas and
homelands-allowing them not only to exchange information about
the homeland but also to learn about one another. The ease with
which diasporas and people in their respective homelands can
communicate and continually constitute and reconstitute the nature
of their relationships has allowed them to define and affirm a
common fate that would not have been possible in an earlier period.
This collective imagining of the past, present, and future, which has
been made significantly easier by the modern media, is what Benedict
Anderson, in another context, suggests results in "imagined
communities. '149 Understood this way, imagined communities are
neither false nor true. Communities are not distinguished by their
genuineness or falsity but rather by the manner in which they are
imagined. 150

148.
For an account of varying aspects of cosmopolitanism, see Held, supra note
6 (summarizing cosmopolitan values in terms of a set of universally shared principals);
William E. Scheuerman, "The Center Cannot Hold" A Response to Benedict Kingsbury,
in MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 205, 207 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S.
Williams eds., 2009) (arguing "[c]osmopolitans offer a no-less one sided universalistic
approach" of international order than one-sided pluralist account of the realists "since
they devalue the fact of pluralism and exaggerate the extent to which shared
agreement on deeply controversial issues is possible at the international level").
149.

See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991)

(giving the title Imagined Communities to a book on the origin and spread of
nationalism).
150.
See id. at 6 ("Communities are to be distinguished, not by their
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.").
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B. The Diasporaand Institutions of the Homeland
Peoplehood is also partly shaped by members inhabiting common
institutions. Oftentimes, narratives of origin and fate are possible
primarily because members share common institutions that make the
production and narration of those stories possible 'and meaningful.
Those institutions could be religious and cultural (as in ethnocultural peoplehood) or economic and political (as in political
peoplehood). In regard to the relationship between diasporas and
homelands, members often share both sets of institutions. Even in
relation to political institutions, which are often assumed to have
territorially limited authority and application, in the age of
globalization, those institutions are reaching to diasporas as easily as
diasporas are reaching back to them. Take political parties as an
example. Many members of diasporas are active in or organizers of
political parties established either within or outside the territorial
limits of the homeland. Indeed, many members hold leadership
positions in those political parties. In relation to political
participation, diasporas play increasingly active roles. Members of
diasporas also participate, at various levels of governance, in many of
the economic institutions of their homelands. And those institutions'
decisions often have significant and widespread effect on members of
the diaspora.
C. DiasporicParticipationand the Issue of Democracy Deficit
As a normative matter, a people is also defined by its capacity for
agency and self-determination in the same way that an individual is
defined as a full human being by the capacity for independence and
agency. 151 Self-determination has two aspects: external and
internal. 152 External self-determination refers to the principle that it
is impermissible for outsiders (nonmembers) to dictate how a
particular people ought to arrange its affairs. 153 External self-

151. This is not to say that, as an empirical matter, a people cannot be an object
of limitation, degradation, or oppression. The fact that a people is subject to conditions
of slavery does not erase the fact that there is a people. And it may be that there are
also circumstances where a people can be forced to be free (what appears to be contrary
to the idea of free agency). See Applbaum, supra note 53, at 367-71 (discussing
whether it is possible to force a people to be free).
152.

See ANTONIO

CASSESE,

SELF-DETERMINATION

OF

PEOPLES: A LEGAL

REAPPRAISAL 52, 101 (1995) (discussing self-determination as "an expression of popular
will" and how "[ijnternal self-determination means the right to authentic selfgovernment"); see also David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of
Sovereignty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 1, 3 (2002) ('The doctrine of sovereignty developed in two
distinct dimensions: the first concerned with the 'internal,' the second with the
'external' aspects of sovereignty.").
153.
Actually, external self-determination itself has two dimensions to it. First,
it is viewed as synonymous with the right to statehood. A people is said to have had the
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determination provides that a people and its boundaries (however the
boundaries are defined) are immune from coercive interference by
outsiders. 154 The function of external self-determination in relation to
communities and peoples is similar to the function of rights in Ronald
Dworkin's legal theory: they are trump cards. They play a negative or
155
restraining role.

Since the mid-twentieth century, legal scholars and international
legal actors have promoted internal self-determination as an

right to self-determination to the extent that it has a right to a state of its own. The
second version holds that outsiders must not interfere with the way that people choose
to run their state. For a legal account of external self-determination, see generally
HANNUM, supra note 90 (using case studies and contemporary international legal
norms to analyze minority rights and the concept of self-determination); MODERN LAW
OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (discussing selfdetermination in a post-colonial era). For an exploration of the concept of external selfdetermination from a political-philosophy focus, see MILLER, supranote 141, at 81-118
(discussing national self-determination); JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 110-30 (1994) (addressing the moral

justifications for national self-determination); Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self
Determination, 105 ETHICS 352, 355-58 (1995) (discussing self-determination and its
relation to liberal democracy).
154.

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 245

(2d ed. 1947) (stating that outsiders must leave it "to every populus" to define their
form of democracy for themselves). I must hasten to add that to say that the notion of
self-determination prohibits coercive interference from the outside, and that it implies
the existence of full agency is not to suggest that the exercise of self-determination
therefore occurs (or is even possible) in an isolated environment where the selfdetermining entity acts within its border in any manner it wishes, oblivious of the
interests and concerns of others (outsiders) with whom it is connected in some way.
Craig Scott is correct when he argues that
self-determination is not a right for peoples to determine their status without
consideration of the rights of other peoples with whom they are presently
connected and with whom they will continue to be connected in the future. For
we must realize that peoples, no less than individuals, exist and thrive only in
a dialogue with each other. Self-determination necessarily involves engagement
with and responsibility to others ....

We need to begin to think of self-

determination in terms of peoples existing in relationship with each other.
Craig Scott, Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonization of the International
Imagination:A Plea, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 814, 819 (1996). Rather, by the notion of external
self-determination, I mean to simply make coercive interference impermissible. Or to
put it differently, I mean to start with the presumption that the entity has the right to
establish its institutions and make its own decisions without interference from
outsiders. But if the entity makes a decision that affects outsiders adversely, then selfdetermination does not preclude others from making claims that need to be dealt with
or adjudicated on. For a relational notion of self-determination, see IRIS MARION
YOUNG, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: WAR, SELF-DETERMINATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR

JUSTICE 49-53 (2007) (discussing "the self-determination of peoples in the context of
relationships").
155.
See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152, 15367 (Jeremy Waldron ed. 1984) ("If someone has a right ... this means that it is for
some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that right, even if they (correctly)
believe that the community as a whole would be better off if they did.").
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important international principle as well. The principle of internal
political self-determination views a people as a community of equals
that is defined by two important elements. First, each member of the
community has a roughly equal chance to contribute to the
origination of the rules1 56 that apply to and bind the community. That
is, the ruled are to be the equal originators of the rules. 157 Second, the
default principle is that the rules and institutions of a community are
to treat each member equally. 158 Strong and publically articulable
reasons must exist if the rules and institutions of the community are
to treat members differentially. If a people is to enjoy full internal
self-determination, then its members must choose, control, and
participate in their government. The only explicit international legal
document to address this issue is the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which declares that "every citizen shall
have the right and the opportunity.., without unreasonable
restrictions: to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives; to vote and be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage."'159
Traditional international law and political theory have assumed
that a community of equals, at the level of both the constitution and
the application of rules, is possible only within the limits of the
territorial statel 6° -what Hannah Arendt calls "the living together of
people.' 161 But that cannot now be the case, even if it were ever
completely so in earlier periods, which is doubtful. Clearly, the
communication revolution is making it easier for individuals across
physical boundaries to engage in a common project of co-origination.
In the era of the communication revolution, democracy does not
require the hard parameter of physical boundaries, but only "public

156.
See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 133, at 120-22
("The idea of self-legislation by citizens, that is, requires that those subject to law as its
addressees can at the same time understand themselves as authors of law.").
157.
See Joshua Cohen, Truth and Public Reason, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 7-8
(2009) (defining democracy as "a society of equals, whose members decide together how
to live together"); see also BOHMAN, supra note 130, at 21 (holding that the people act
through the elected legislature to give themselves laws according to the popular will).
158.
The egalitarian principle is expressed by Ronald Dworkin thusly:
"[I]ndividuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and
administration of the political institutions that govern them." See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1978).

159.
ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 25; see also UDHR, supra note 18, art. 21
("[E]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.").
160.
See KYMLICKA, supra note 140, at 324 ("Territorialized linguistic/national
political units provide the best and perhaps the only sort of forum for genuine
participatory and deliberative politics.").
161.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 201 (2d ed. 1958) ("[Ihe only
indispensable material factor in the generation of [collective] power is the living
together of people.").
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spaces and points of reference through which issues can be defined
and pressures for action can be organized."' 16 2 The use of new
communication technologies (such as websites, e-mails, and online
editions of newspapers and broadcasts) has brought about and
consolidated the transnational public space, 6 3 which may be referred
to as the diasporic public space. 16 4 The dissemination of news about
the homeland raises issues for discussion. The diasporic public space
brings the stakeholders together. The question of self-determination
is not, therefore, about who occupies a particular physical space at a
given moment of time. Rather, it is about who comprises the
stakeholders 16 5 and what institutional structures will enable all
stakeholders to participate in the affairs and life of the community
and the people. The traditional (and radical statist) assumptions that
territory acts as the basic unit of both external and internal selfdetermination and that only those within the territory of the nationstate can be stakeholders do not fully capture the reality. Members of
diasporas can be stakeholders, and their interests can be affected by
decisions of the authorities of the homeland. The principle of affected
interests suggests that their participation in some aspects of the life
of the homeland therefore comports with the notion of selfdetermination. The territorialist position is also at odds with how
people can organize themselves as agents and the various venues in
or through which democratic participation can take place.
Two responses address the concern that the participation of
diasporas in the life of the homeland is largely premised on the notion

162.
CONNOLLY, supra note 141, at 153.
163.
Exploring the reasons why Chinese citizens who have spent time in the
West may show a hostile streak to the West, Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt make the
following observation:
Some of the nationalism exhibited by Chinese living abroad might also
be sustained, rather than diluted, by the Internet. "As soon as they get online
they can be totally immersed in a Chinese environment," says Zhao Chuan, a
novelist who lived in Australia from 1987 to 2000 before coming home to write
about Shanghai. 'When we were studying abroad... occasionally you went to
Chinatown to read a Chinese paper. Now if you're in the U.K. you can easily
not read English papers or watch English TV."
Melinda Liu & Duncan Hewitt, Rise of the Sea Turtles: China's Most Modern Citizens
Aren't Drawing It Any Closer to the West, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 2008.
164.
Iris Young defines (international) public space as one that "consists in a
discursive space mediating strangers in which claims and criticisms can be made with
the knowledge that they are heard by many others, including political leaders and
other powerful actors." YOUNG, supra note 154, at 1.
165.
See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 133, at 107-11 ("I
include among 'those affected' (or involved) anyone whose interests are touched by the
foreseeable consequences of a general practice regulated by norms at issue."). Some
refer to the notion of stakeholding as the principle of "affected interests." See, e.g.,
Robert E. Goodin, EnfranchisingAll Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 40, 50 (2007).
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166
that these actors "may shape and determine the autonomy of
homeland residents and citizens without the latter's agreement or
consent. This Article explored one of those responses in the preceding
pages. First, the conception that diasporas are "choice-makers" and
the people residing in the homeland are "choice-takers" assumes that
diasporas do not have a stake in homeland affairs, or that they do not
shoulder the consequences of their choices to the same degree as
those in the homeland. However, as argued earlier, this view conflicts
with reality. Homeland governments often make decisions that affect
diasporas, and thus diasporas' desire to have input in the decision
making process represents the proper approach for a stakeholder.
Second, as this Article shall show in the next few pages, the way to
ensure the accountability of choice-takers is to allow them to make
choices concerning the specific areas in which they have a stake and
to subject choice-makers to a degree of vulnerability to the
consequences of institutional action similar to that faced by other
members of the political community. This approach conceives of a
dynamic notion of community and a more complicated structure of
membership.

D. InstitutionalArrangements for the Community of
Stakeholders: The Avenues of Participation
What institutional arrangements will be consistent with the idea
of diasporas as stakeholders in the community of the homeland? That
is, how can members of the diaspora best play a role in the affairs of
the homeland without raising the issue of democracy deficit? What is
the package of privileges (and rights) to which members of diasporas
are entitled? The issue here concerns the conditions for shared
agency-the circumstances for the constitution of normative
peoplehood.
1.

To Vote or Not to Vote

One of the most important means of participating in the affairs
of a community (to manifest shared agency) is to have the opportunity
"to vote and to be elected," to use the ICCPR formulation. 167 As

166.
167.

Held, supra note 152, at 26.
See ICCPR, supranote 47, art. 25. Article 25 mandates:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity... without
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected
at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors ....
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Arthur Applbaum put it: "an election (when the conditions for its
'16
legitimacy are met) is a performative, the action of a shared agent.
But the ICCPR recognizes this right only for "all individuals within
[the State's] territory and subject to its jurisdiction.' 169 So, the right
under the ICCPR seems to assume the rigid community of the
territorial state, where presence in the territory acts as a prerequisite
for the enjoyment of the right. 170 According to this reading, diasporas
of all types (including temporary absentees from the homeland) have
no claim for equal suffrage. Of course, there is no limit under
international law on a particular state franchising its diaspora, no
matter which category the diaspora falls within. Some states allow
171
their citizens temporarily residing outside of the country to vote,
other states grant dual citizenship, 172 and still others have franchised

Id. For an interpretive comment from the Human Rights Committee on the scope of
Article 25, see Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), The Right To Participate in
Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, U.N. Doc.
CCPRJC/21JRev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996).
168.
Applbaum, supranote 53, at 375.
169.
ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 2 (emphasis added).
170.
The Human Rights Committee has not read the phrase "all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction" as requiring both presence in the
territory and subjection to jurisdiction, contrary to the position of the United States
and to what the conjunction "and" seems to suggest. The Committee reads the phrase
as requiring states to ensure the rights to "all persons who may be within their
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction." See Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
State Parties to the Covenant,
10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21[Rev.l/Add.13 (Mar. 29,
2004). The U.S. position is set out in its response to the Committee's comment on its
Third Periodic Report. See Human Rights Comm., Comments by the Government of the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/USAICO/3[Rev.l/Add.1 (Feb 12, 2008)
("[T]he United States respectfully disagrees with the view of the Committee that the
Covenant applies extraterritorially."). It reaffirms its long-standing position that
signatory states are required "to ensure the rights in the Covenant only to individuals
who are (1) within the territory of a State Party and (2) subject to that State Party's
jurisdiction." Id.
171.
Thus, for example, the Austrian Constitutional Court has read the Federal
Constitution Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGB1 No.
393/1929, arts. 26(1), 60(1) (Austria)), which provides that the Austrian national
parliament and the federal president shall be elected by the Bundesvolk ("federal
people"), as including all Austrian citizens regardless of residence in the country or
abroad.
172.
See Sybil Rhodes & Arus Harutyunyan, Extending Citizenship to
Emigrants: Democratic Contestation and a New Global Norm, 31 INT'L POL. SCI. REV.
470, 471 (2010) ("Recent scholarship on the relations between emigrants and their
homelands has shown that many states tolerate multiple citizenship and have
developed programs to channel their participation in national political, civic, and
economic life."). See generally U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FED. INVESTIGATIVE
SERVS.,

CITIZENSHIP

LAWS

OF

THE

WORLD

(2001),

http://www.opm.gov/extra/

investigate/IS-O1.pdf (providing summaries of the citizenship laws for most countries).
Some emigrant countries, mainly European, have laws that allow second- or thirdgeneration descendants of their emigrant citizens to reacquire the nationality of their
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all first-generation expatriates, even if they do not hold citizenship of
the homeland and even if they have not applied for and received dual
73
citizenship.'
What voting procedure would be most consistent with the
notions of democracy and self-determination, both for those living in
the homeland and for the diaspora? One must start with the
observation that different communities exist in a nation-state for
different purposes (federal, state, and municipal communities, for
example), and individuals are accorded the right to vote within those
various communities if they are regarded as stakeholders.1 74 A
similar approach may be helpful in relation to the issue of whether
members of a diaspora should be accorded the right to vote. If the
issue is about national identity, rather than specifically about the
condition of life within the territorial homeland, then it seems
reasonable to allow members of the diaspora to take part in the
voting process. After all, members of the diaspora are stakeholders in
the identity of the nation to the extent that their very identity is
partly defined by the identity of the homeland. 175 For this purpose,
members of the diaspora are part of we the people. If the issues
concern only those living in the homeland, then the members of the
diaspora need not (and perhaps should not) participate in the voting
process, for under those circumstances they cannot be viewed as
stakeholders. On the other hand, because issues of a general nature
indirectly impact members of the diaspora, even though they may not
specifically concern them, some representation of the diaspora would
be important. That representation could range from an advisory
board of diaspora members 176 to the reservation of some seats in the

ancestors. Thus, for example, in 1992 Italy passed a law that allowed "the descendants
of Italians who had emigrated before 1970 to acquire citizenship." Patrick Weil, From
Conditionalto Secured and Sovereign: The New Strategic Link Between the Citizen and
the Nation-State in a Globalized World, 9 INT'L J. CONST. L. 615, 630 (2011). And
apparently, between 1998 and 2007, 786,000 foreigners of Italian descent obtained
Italian citizenship. Id.
173.
Iraq, for example, allowed Iraqis around the world to vote in the first free
elections after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
174.
It is not just in relation to federal states (countries) that this occurs. The
European Union has also adopted a procedure that allows citizens of member states to
vote in the election of municipalities of any other member state in which they reside.
Thus, for example, an Italian is allowed to vote in a Paris mayoral election if she is
living in Paris. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, art. 19, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
175.

See CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 84 (2002) ("Voting rights on

matters of national identity and membership that have little to do with life in the
homeland... could be granted equally to all members of the national group.").
176.
For example, the Jewish-American diplomat, Dennis Ross, who was the
chief negotiator for the U.S. Middle East Peace Team under the Clinton
administration, suggested to the Israeli government under Ariel Sharon that it grant
diaspora Jewry an official consulting status when it comes to Israeli foreign policy that
has an effect on the entire Jewish people. See SHAIN, supranote 10, at 112.
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national legislative body for diaspora members. 177 The manner in
which those seats are filled could vary from country to country,
depending on the conditions in the country.
The question of whom to include as a member of the diaspora for
purposes of voting or representation presents a complex issue: who
can legitimately be considered a member of the community of the
affected (a stakeholder). 1 78 As the discussion thus far indicates, as a
general matter, first-generation members of the diaspora would be
presumed to be members of the community of the affected because
they have a stake in the community they call the homeland. For
instance, the identity. of the nation shapes, at least partly, their
senses of self and identities; they are likely to have close family
members (for whom they might be financially responsible) who would
be affected by the policies and actions of the government; some may
have been forced out of the country by regimes with less-thandemocratic credentials; and many may offer important contributions
to a post-conflict society. 179 With regard to subsequent generations,
there would have to be further requirements, such as active
involvement in the affairs of the homeland, to indicate their
investment in the community that renders them stakeholders.
As a matter of practical politics, proposals to enfranchise
members of diasporas may face resistance from people within the
territory of the homeland because the notion of territorial boundary

177.
See Baubbck, supra note 22, at 2401. In the 2006 Italian parliamentary
election, "[elxpatriates were subdivided into four geographic constituencies... and
voted for twelve reserved seats in the lower chamber and six in the senate, for which
all of the candidates were themselves expatriates." Id. For different forms of
representation of members of the diaspora see Spiro, supra note 135, at 226-31. The
French Constitution makes provisions for French citizens living abroad to elect two
members of the French Senate as representatives of the French diaspora. See 1958
CONST. art. 24 (Fr.) ("French Nationals living abroad shall be represented in the
National Assembly and in the Senate."). Apparently, under French law, a simple
acquisition of another nationality is not sufficient ground for losing French citizenship.
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 23 (Fr.) ("An adult of French nationality residing usually
abroad, who acquires voluntarily a foreign nationality, loses French nationality only
where he so declares expressly, in the way provided for in Article 26 and following of
this Title."). Article 26 then provides the procedure by which the French national
should indicate that he wishes to terminate his or her French nationality:
"Declarations of nationality shall be received by the juge d'instance or by consuls in the
form prescribed by decree in Conseil d'Etat. An acknowledgment of receipt must be
issued after the filing of the documents necessary for proving their admissibility." Id.
art. 26.
178.
See generally Goodin, supra note 165 (exploring how members of the
decision-making group should be those with affected interests).
179.
For a discussion of the role of diasporas in post conflict societies (especially
severely fractured societies), see Adeno Addis, Deliberative Democracy in Severely
Fractured Societies, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 78-79 (2009). For a more
detailed discussion of the role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation and settlement, see
infra, note 207.
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remains deeply ingrained in people's imaginations. That is partly
because people in the homeland may still harbor suspicions about
those who have left home rather than sticking with the homeland
through bad and good times. Resistance may also arise partly because
people in the homeland may believe that the enfranchisement of the
diaspora would have too strong an impact on the political and
economic life of the homeland, given the high ratio of people in the
diaspora to people in the homeland. In Hungary, for example, a 2004
referendum concerning dual citizenship for Hungarians in
neighboring countries, estimated at 3.5 million, was defeated. One of
the main concerns of the proposal's opponents was the fact that the
availability of external voting rights would have significant impact in
a country of 10 million citizens.18 0
Allowing members of the diaspora to participate in the electoral
process of the homeland will, of course, lead to dual voting for most
members of the diaspora: one vote in the homeland and another in
the host land. Dual voting may be objected to on two grounds: that it
is somehow unjust for some people to have a right to vote twice, and
that the process may lead to a split, and hence diminished, loyalty to
both homeland and host land.' 8 1 As to the unfairness of allowing
multiple (dual) voting for members of the diaspora, the issue is not
the number of votes cast, but whether the individuals casting them
have a stake in the various communities in which they seek
representation. After all, in a federal system, individuals have
opportunities to cast votes at various levels of government without

180.
Baub6ck, supra note 22, at 2401.
181.
See id. at 2428-30 (noting a singular conception of voters' national loyalty
is inaccurate in a globalizing world, particularly when the voter's home and host states
enjoy a peaceful relationship and high levels of interaction). The conversation in
relation to a recent case in the United States makes the point. Representative Michele
Bachmann, a conservative member of the U.S. Congress from Minnesota and one who
campaigned for the office of the presidency in the recent Republican primary as the
champion of Tea Party values, had apparently taken Swiss citizenship by virtue of the
fact that her husband was born to Swiss immigrants to the United States. When the
fact that she has dual citizenship was reported, there was uproar from the right-wing
bloggers who are usually her political supporters. The uproar led her to publicly ask
the Swiss consulate to withdraw her citizenship. Her statement read partly thus: "I
took this action to make it clear... I am a proud American citizen. I am, and always
have been, 100 percent committed to our United States Constitution and the United
States of America." Tim Mak, Michele Bachmann Renounces Swiss Citizenship,
POLITICO (May 10, 2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/
76175.html. Some of the comments from the bloggers indicate that they believe that
dual citizenship will lead to diminished loyalty. One blogger wrote: "Dual citizenship
isn't simply a matter of convenience, a way to make travel easier or a sentimental tie to
the Auld Sod ....It's an insult to both countries." Tim Mak, Michele Bachmann
Blasted by Right Blogs, POLITICO (May 11, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.politico.coml
news/stories/0512/76211.html. Another simply observed that dual citizenship "is
[tireason." Id. And still another penned that "[flor most of the [United States'] history,
dual citizenship was considered the equivalent of political bigamy." Id.
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that system raising any serious conceptual or fairness issues because
the individuals are thought to have a stake in the various
communities in which they participate. If they have a stake, then the
right to participate in constituting the government of the community
and making that government accountable will not (and should not)
appear odd.
As to the issue of dual and diminished loyalties,' 8 2 the idea of
limited and exhaustible loyalty is conceptually incoherent and at odds
with the reality of a globalized world where individuals are
increasingly attached to varying communities with different
commitments and loyalties.' 8 3 Being a stakeholder in one community
does not drain all the commitments one may have to another
community to which one is also attached. Indeed, even in a nationstate, individuals manifest loyalty to different layers of communities
without diminishing their commitment and loyalty to the other
layers. 18 4 The world will increasingly be one where individuals
happily belong to multiple, and at times overlapping, communities
(and peoples)-a world which the notion of exhaustible loyalties
cannot describe or capture.
2.

To Be or Not to Be a Card-Carrying Member

Although voting is one of the most important means of
participation, and a very clear signal of membership in a community,
it is not the only one. A number of countries have started to devise
programs that allow members of their diasporas to have residency
cards that make it easier for them to enter the country without visas,
to pursue business ventures without having to comply with

182.
See Alexander Aleinikoff, Between National and Post-National:
Membership in the United States 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 241, 258 (1999) (discussing how
frequent movement across borders "may challenge the creation of stable, rooted
associations," and "[i]ndividuals may end up living in what is in effect a transnational
community, straddling two worlds but at home in neither"). David Martin makes the
point that dual citizens ought to vote in only one country. David A. Martin,
Introduction: The Trend Toward Dual Nationality, in RIGHTS & DUTIES OF DUAL
NATIONALS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS 3, 14 (David A. Martin & Kay Hailbronner

eds., 2003).
See Peter Spiro, PoliticalRights and Dual Nationality, in RIGHTS & DUTIES
183.
OF DUAL NATIONALS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS 135, 135 (David A. Martin & Kay
Hailbronner eds., 2003) (noting the erosion of the singular national loyalty concept).
184.
This is not to say that there may not be times when the two loyalties
conflict, such as in times of war. But such an occasion is likely to be rare, for an
individual is unlikely to maintain dual nationality in countries that are in such state of
unfriendliness. There could be clashes of loyalties in circumstances that do not involve
direct military conflicts between the two countries of which one is a national. A good
example is military service. In circumstance such as those, there is going to be a need
for a principle that will allow us to adjudicate as to which country has priority. Perhaps
something like the place of primary residence would work.
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regulatory requirements that apply to foreigners, to hold jobs that are
generally unavailable to foreigners, and the like. 185 If members of
diasporas who are citizens of another country and do not have dual
citizenship return to the country with a residency card that allows
them to work and invest in the country in a manner no different from
citizens of the country, then it would not be improper to allow them to
vote, for they hold a direct stake in the community. The concern with
outsiders determining rules and policies from which they are safely
immune (the fear of democratic deficit) will not apply in this
circumstance.18 6 But, of course, to have these rights entails
corresponding duties to the community. The members of a diaspora
who avail themselves of these rights may, for example, be conscripted
for military service in the homeland. Packages of membership
privileges entail packages of membership duties.
3.

Diasporic Participation: A Caution

The brief remarks about voting and residency permits as
examples of diasporic participation are meant to be just that:
examples. They should not and cannot be interpreted as an
exhaustive list of the ways in which stakeholders can participate.
There are many other ways in which diasporic participation could be
envisaged and structured, such as diasporic advisory councils. What
is important, however, is the realization that members of diasporas
are stakeholders in relation to aspects of the life of the homeland and
that their participation in the life of the homeland vindicates, rather
than negates, the principle of "affected interests" that a number of
political theorists have advanced as a central feature of democratic
governance. 187 As Christian List and Mathias Koeing-Archibugi put

185.
Ethiopia is a good example. The Ethiopian government offers "Ethiopian
Origin Identity cards to Ethiopians who hold foreign citizenship. According to [an
official in the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington] the cards entitle the holder to all
Ethiopian-citizen rights except for the right to vote." Terrazas, supra note 4.
Apparently, the government also allows the "creation of domestic accounts in foreign
currency for Ethiopians abroad," although with limits on the amount to be deposited.
Id.
186.
Some states in the United States allow local governments to enfranchise
noncitizen permanent residents to participate in local elections. See RON HAYDUK,
DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

87-107 (2006). The European Union also allows citizens of member countries to
participate in local elections where they happen to reside. See EC Treaty, supra note
174, art. 19.
187.
Although formulated in various ways by various political theorists, the
principle of affected interests simply means that people should be allowed to influence
the decisions that will have an effect on them. The principle is based on two important
assumptions. First, it is unjust for individuals to suffer or experience the consequences
of decisions that they did not have any right or chance to shape or influence. This is so
partly because the decisions may not have taken their interests into account. Second,
the idea of individual autonomy requires that individuals be acknowledged as agents
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it, "[A]ll those (potentially) affected by decisions on the given issues
are entitled to take part in those decisions and should therefore be
members of the demos.' 8
The affected interests principle implies (requires) that different
communities or different constituencies of voters participate for
different issues. As argued earlier, this is not a drawback of the
principle, as some view it, 8 but rather its virtue. It recognizes the
reality of the globalized world where there are many overlapping
communities. Therefore, different communities could be drawn for
different issues. The all-purpose territorial community does not
describe the current world, and it will even less describe the world
ahead.
E. InstitutionalArrangements for the Community of
Stakeholders: The Avenues of Protection
1.

Diasporic Jurisdiction

Membership in a community bestows not only the right to
participation in the affairs of the community, but also the right to
protection (by the authorized leaders and institutions of the
community) from unwarranted attacks. This subpart shall explore
the sorts of protection members of the diaspora could justly expect
from the government and authorities of the homeland by virtue of the
fact that they are inside the people, although outside the state.
Suppose the government of the homeland (the kin state) wishes to
protect its diaspora from criminal attacks anywhere. This assertion of

capable of self-governance. For various formulations of the principle see DAHL, AFTER
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 64-67 (noting that while the practical application
of the principle of affected interests make it "a good deal less compelling than it looks,"
it nonetheless gives affected parties a case for participating in relevant decisions);
Goodin, supra note 165, at 51-63 (exploring the feasibility of different articulations of
the "all affected interests" principle); List & Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 37, at 80-84
(describing how the membership of a group may change based on affectedness or
affectivity criteria).
188.
List & Koenig-Archibugi, supranote 37, at 80-81.
189.

An obvious practical difficulty with the all-affected principle is
that it would require a different constituency of voters or participants
for every decision: the status of fellow-citizens would not be
permanent, as is the case in territorial states with which we ordinarily
associate the concept of citizenship, but would shift in relation to the
issue proposed.

Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: XXV NoMos 13, 19 (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman
eds., 1983).

1030

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:963

protective jurisdiction can be called "diasporic jurisdiction."'190 On the
one hand, that is precisely what a community would do to ensure the
safety and well-being of its members. But on the other hand, this
would look dangerously close to universal jurisdiction, about which
critics have raised a number of concerns and issues. 191 To the extent
that the diasporas of countries such as Israel, Armenia, and even
Ethiopia are spread all over the world, diasporic jurisdiction appears
to be functionally equivalent to universal jurisdiction, at least in the
territorial sense. This subpart shall argue that diasporic jurisdiction
does, in fact, differ from universal jurisdiction and that it presents a
more justifiable assertion of jurisdiction.
Diasporic jurisdiction refers to the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by a kin state over crimes committed against members of
its diaspora. Thus, for example, Israeli law gives its courts
jurisdiction over what it terms "extraterritorial crimes"-crimes
committed against "the life of a Jew, his body, his health, or his
property, because he is a Jew, or the property of a Jewish institution,
because it is Jewish. ' 19 2 Israel is not the only country showing
interest in its diaspora. Many countries (e.g., Armenia, India, and
Russia) are reaching out to their diasporas as the diasporas are
reaching back to them, although not always positively. The Polish
the Polish
"We,
in its preamble:
Constitution provides
Nation .... [b]ound in community with our compatriots dispersed
throughout the world ... [h]ereby establish this Constitution of the
Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State .... -193 Similarly,
Article 2 of The Irish Constitution provides: "[T]he Irish nation
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living
194
abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage."'
Under what circumstances should a kin state assert diasporic
jurisdiction? And what are the political and legal consequences of the
assertion of such jurisdiction? Under the Israeli law, the assertion of
jurisdiction is directed at identity-motivated criminal attacks. The
law is triggered when a Jew is criminally attacked by virtue of the
fact that he is a Jew, and his property damaged precisely because it is

190.
For a comparison of diasporic jurisdiction with one of the internationally
recognized bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction, see infra
Part VI.E.2.
191.
See Addis, supra note 7 (discussing how the concept of universal
jurisdiction has been criticized). See generally Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of
Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2001
(warning of the injustice inherent to the extreme use of universal jurisdiction and
offering the creation of ad hoc tribunals by the UN Security Council as an alternative).
192.
Penal Law (1977), 5737-1977, art. 2, § 13(b) (amended 1994) (Isr.).
193.
POL. CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/
angielski/konl.htm (emphasis added).
194.
IR. CONST., 1937, art. 2, available at http://www.constitution.ie/constitutionof-ireland/default.asp.
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Jewish property. So, one limit on diasporic jurisdiction is that it
concerns identity-based attacks. That is a reasonable line to draw.
First, the identity of the members of the diaspora (being a Jew, being
Armenian, or being Indian) is precisely what links the diaspora and
people of the homeland as a people. If the members of the diaspora
are attacked precisely for the traits shared (or presumably shared)
with members of the homeland, then an attack on the diaspora can
fairly be regarded as an attack on the whole community. The
particular member of the group was attacked precisely because he or
she is considered to be a type, a representative, of a group that is
ultimately the target.
Second, as the Israeli law shows, another limit to diasporic
jurisdiction is the targeting of only criminal acts. That, of course,
greatly narrows the universe of acts for which diasporic jurisdiction
could be asserted and, consequently, reduces the number of occasions
that might put the homeland and the host land in jurisdictional
conflict. In this regard, diasporic jurisdiction will not be any different
from current forms of universal jurisdiction. It is not only the
negative political virtue that recommends the limit to criminal
jurisdiction, but also the fact that it deals with the most often used
(and often the deadliest) means of identity-based attacks.
Even in this limited sense (targeting identity-based criminal
attacks), diasporic jurisdiction could potentially lead to chaotic
assertions of jurisdiction and to less-than-tranquil international
relations. How can such dangers be avoided, or at least minimized?
First, unlike the Israeli law, which is aimed at any identity-based
attack, however serious, perhaps diasporic jurisdiction should be
invoked only in relation to attacks on individuals (without including
jurisdiction in relation to property damage) and only in relation to
serious crimes. These serious crimes could be construed as those
generally regarded as subject to universal jurisdiction under
customary international law-genocide, crimes against humanity,
torture, war crimes, etc.-some of which are also codified under the
Rome Convention, the instrument that established the International
Criminal Court. 195 Beyond often being identity-motivated, those
crimes also pose the greatest threat to the group as a group.
Furthermore, under those circumstances, the government of the host
state is likely to be either implicated or incapable of rendering justice.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines the
195.
international crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crimes of aggression. See Rome Statute of the
Conference of
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic
International
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 1517, 1998, art. 5, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Now, the question may arise as to why one would bother about
diasporic jurisdiction if the same crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction. Three responses come to mind. First, diasporic
jurisdiction proves conceptually and functionally more defensible
than universal jurisdiction. Second, given the close relationship
between the kin state and the diaspora, diasporic jurisdiction may
have a better chance of being used than universal jurisdiction. If the
universal jurisdiction is treaty-based, then the relevant state might
not be a signatory state. Third, it is reasonable to assume that a state
intervening to protect or avenge a vulnerable kin will be more likely
to be guided by the interests and needs of victims than a country
invoking universal jurisdiction in relation to individual victims with
whom it has no discernible connection. 196
A second reasonable limit on the assertion of diasporic
jurisdiction is procedural in nature. Diasporic jurisdiction should be
asserted only after it becomes clear that the state with a traditional
jurisdictional link to the actors or to the event has no intention or
capacity to prosecute the perpetrators or to otherwise render justice.
The host state or the state with the most appropriate traditional
jurisdictional link ought to be given priority to deal with the issue.
This, of course, is what is referred to as the complementarity
principle that is enshrined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 197 Such
a principle would not only minimize the occasions for interstate
conflicts, but it would affirm the importance of internationally
recognized territorial communities while also signaling that other,
equally legitimate ways of constituting communities exist.
Perhaps a third limit might be to require that the kin state's law
follow the internationally accepted definitions of those crimes if the
kin state wishes to assert diasporic jurisdiction. Thus, for example, a
kin state that wishes to prosecute defendants who have committed
the crime of genocide against its diaspora should do so under a law
that has incorporated the international definition of genocide. Indeed,

It is probably true that interventions by a kin state on behalf of vulnerable
196.
diaspora is likely to have mixed motives when the host state is a neighboring state and
where the diaspora has become a pretext for irredentism. Two things need to be said
about that possibility. First, the requirement that only the most egregious crimes allow
the assertion of diasporic jurisdiction may provide the necessary restraint. Given the
fact that the neighboring countries' relationships would presumably have already been
strained, the world will watch the intervention with critical eyes. That too may have a
restraining effect. Second, if the relationship between disapora and host land is such
that irredentism is a live issue, then the relationship is already in serious trouble. With
or without diasporic jurisdiction, irredentism would likely have been advanced by the
kin state.
197.
Article 17(1)(a) provides: "[T]he Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where: The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
[traditional] jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution." Rome Statute, supra note 195, art. 17(1)(a).
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this should be the case whether diasporic or universal jurisdiction is
being asserted.
There are now two more questions to consider about diasporic
jurisdiction. First, is the Israeli case unique, such that it should not
be regarded as an indication of what other countries may or should
do? Second, is diasporic jurisdiction conceptually and functionally
more, or less, defensible than universal jurisdiction?
In regard to the first question, it is true that the Israeli case has
historically been viewed as unique. The country was set up as a home
for Jews, foreshadowing that Jews anywhere constitute potential
members of the Israeli community. In fact, the Law of Return that
entitles any Jew anywhere to immigrate to Israel ("to make aliyah to
Israel") affirms the deep connection between Israel and the Jewish
diaspora. 198 Also, the history of anti-Semitism, the continuing
migration of Jews to Israel, and the fact that Israel is defined as the
"state of the Jewish people"'199 all contribute to making the
relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora uniquely close
and strong. Despite unique aspects of the Israeli case, diasporic
jurisdiction can and may appeal to other kin states. First, as argued
throughout this Article, many homeland governments have shown
great interest in their diasporas as the diasporas have increasingly
embraced the homeland. The security of the diaspora has become part
of some governments' foreign policy. Russia provides a good example,
apparently viewing itself as a protector of the "stranded" diaspora
living in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Often,
protection comes in the form of military attacks or military threats,
reminiscent of the condition that prevailed during the interwar
period. Pursuing the similarity between that period and the current
one, the diasporic jurisdiction would be equivalent to the many
bilateral treaties and unilateral declarations required as conditions of
membership to the League of Nations. One of the major purposes of
those treaties and unilateral declarations was to minimize military
engagements on behalf of coethnics in other, often neighboring,
states. Diasporic jurisdiction may partly serve a similar purpose.
As to the question of whether diasporic jurisdiction is
conceptually and functionally more defensible than universal
jurisdiction, the answer is "yes." The availability of prescriptive and
adjudicative universal jurisdiction for certain acts (often crimes) is
premised on the proposition that these acts affect all people, not just
the specific individual or group victimized, or the country of which the
victims are nationals. Indeed, those who commit these offenses are

198.
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.) ("Every Jew has the right
to come to this country as an oleh.").
199.
Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9), 5745-1985, SH No. 1155 p.
196 (Isr.).
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referred to as hostes humani generis-enemies of human kind.
Universal jurisdiction, therefore, is premised on the notion that there
is an international community of humankind that can be injured
whenever and wherever certain crimes are committed. Universal
jurisdiction is a form of cosmopolitanism-the idea that we owe our
highest allegiance to humankind. However, it is not always clear how
that allegiance develops and how a crime directed against an
individual on the other side of the globe, with no visible connection
with the political community that seeks to intervene on the
individual's behalf, could be said to constitute an attack on that
community or any other community outside the political community
to which the victim belongs. Unlike the uncertain status of an
international community, 200 the relationship between diasporas and
homelands manifests a community of character. The concern of the
homeland for the safety and security of its diaspora, therefore, is a
concern for individuals who might be outside the state but are inside
the people. The members of the diaspora clearly view themselves as
part of the homeland. The homeland, in turn, views them as
connected to the political community, and third parties see them as
connected to the kin state.
Diasporic jurisdiction is also functionally more defensible than
universal jurisdiction to the extent that kin states are more likely to
come to the aid of members of diasporas by utilizing diasporic
jurisdiction than states are to assert universal jurisdiction in the
defense of victims who have no obvious connection to their political
community. In the event that an international tribunal has been
authorized by a treaty (or by the relevant international organ) to
assert universal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of crimes that
victimized members of a diaspora, then the kin state must give
priority to the international tribunal to assert its jurisdiction (in the
same way that it must defer to the state with the most appropriate
traditional jurisdictional
link before
it asserts
diasporic
jurisdiction). 20 1 This, too, will limit the occasions for jurisdictional
conflicts, while ensuring that victims receive redress for their
injuries.

200.
In a recent article, I have attempted to describe and defend a theory of
universal jurisdiction that appropriates a notion of community that I believe better
accounts for the list of crimes that international law, especially customary
international law, considers crimes against all of us. See Addis, supra note 7, 142-62.
201.
See id. at 157-58 (describing how judicial chaos has been avoided as
"jurisdictional priority is settled through diplomatic means and the balancing of
different states' interests").
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Personality

As it is probably clear to those familiar with the norms of
international prescriptive jurisdictions, diasporic jurisdiction bears a
passing resemblance to what international lawyers and legal scholars
refer to as passive personality jurisdiction. Both concern protecting
people with a personal connection (kin) to the state asserting the
jurisdiction. According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,
the passive personality principle provides that "a state may apply
law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed outside its
territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was
its national. 20°2 As the Restatement notes, this jurisdiction has not
really been accepted "for ordinary torts or crimes." 20 3 However, it is
increasingly being accepted for "organized attacks on a state's
nationals by reason of their nationality. '20 4 In this sense, it appears

202.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(2) cmt. g (1987); see also LOWE, supra note 87, at 175 ("Some States apply a
variant of national jurisdiction known as 'passive personality jurisdiction, under which
the State may apply its laws to person who injure its nationals.").
203.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2) cmt. g.
204.
Id. And this clearly is not totally accurate. The United States officially
opposes the passive personality theory of jurisdiction on the ground that it intrudes
into the sovereignty of states. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 903
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating that "the Passive Personal principle traditionally has been an
anathema to United States lawmakers"), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). But the
United States has nevertheless passed statutes that can best be explained or defended
under that theory of jurisdiction. For example, the Hostage Taking Statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1996), provides:
[W]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and
threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to
compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person
detained, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment ...[if] the offender or the person seized
or detained is a national of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute was passed as an implementation of the Convention
Against Taking Hostages. Perhaps one could: conclude that the United States applies
passive personality jurisdiction to terrorism-related acts. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The
Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT'L L.A. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing that the United
States does not apply passive personality jurisdiction outside terrorist crimes).
France too had once opposed this basis of jurisdiction. Indeed, its objection was
stated early in the famous S.S. Lotus. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). France's objection persisted until the mid-1970s when its
nationals became victims of hostage taking by terrorists. See Eric Cafritz & Omer
Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The Passive Personality Principle, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 594 (2003) (describing the enactment of legislation
which established the basis for passive personality jurisdiction in France after the 1974
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to be similar to the sorts of limits that this Article argued should be
put on diasporic jurisdiction. The difference between passive
personality and diasporic jurisdiction is that the former is limited to
citizens ("nationals," to use the Restatement's formulation), while the
latter captures all those who are part of a people, whether citizens or
not, but who reside outside the territory in a host state. A secbnd
difference is in the range of criminal acts considered subject to these
jurisdictions. This Article argued that diasporic jurisdiction ought to
be limited to the most serious of crimes-essentially those identitybased crimes that have been accepted as violations of jus cogens
norms-while passive personality is often invoked for a wide variety
of crimes. In this sense, diasporic jurisdiction has less potential for
intrusiveness than jurisdiction based on passive personality. Another
consequence of limiting diasporic jurisdiction to those grave crimes is
that, in the event that a kin state seeks the extradition of the alleged
perpetrator of the crime, the request would not run up against the
"dual criminality"20 5 requirement that many countries have adopted.
The requirement provides that the alleged crime be defined as a
crime in both the requesting and the requested state for extradition
to occur. Because the crimes proposed to be subject to diasporic
jurisdiction are crimes in almost all countries, the dual criminality
requirement would not pose a problem.
F. InstitutionalArrangementsfor the Community of
Stakeholders: The Role of the Diasporain
ConstitutionalSettlement in Post-Conflict Societies
Diasporas, especially those from severely fractured societies,
play a significant role in the life of their homelands.2 0 6 Here, the

"Hague incident"). Now France has statutes that appropriate passive personality
jurisdiction. Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code, for example, provides that "French
criminal law is applicable to any felony, as well as any misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment, committed by a French or foreign national outside the territory of the
French Republic, where the victim is a French national at the time of the offense."
CODE PtNAL [C. PtN.] (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content
download/1957/13715/version4/file/Code_33.pdf (Fr.). The breadth of the passive
personality jurisdiction under the French law is, therefore, much wider than the
Restatement's suggestion. As John G. McCarthy notes, the "French law provides
jurisdiction to the broadest extent possible under passive personality principle." John

G. McCarthy, The Passiue PersonalityPrinciple and Its Use in Combating International
Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298, 314 (1990). Other countries such as China,
Italy, and Denmark apply passive personality jurisdiction, but for "certain classes of
crimes or to crimes with a certain minimum degree of punishment." Cafritz & Tene,
supra, at 596.
205.
See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte, (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) [182]-[183] (U.K.).
206.
See Addis, supra note 179, at 78-79 ("It is abundantly clear that diasporas,
especially those from severely divided societies, have played and will continue to play
significant roles in the life of their homelands.").
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concern is the role members of the diaspora have played in starting or
sustaining conflicts in the homeland. The involvement of diasporas
from severely fractured societies in conflicts involving various groups
20 7
Diasporas have financed
in the homeland is well documented.
20 9
20 8 and supported coethnics fighting for independence.
rebellions
They have lobbied host governments on behalf of the favored group in
the conflict. At times, they have even organized political parties
outside the country or run those established within the country from
abroad. And yet, despite the widespread recognition of the important
role diasporas play in conflict perpetuation 210 as well as conflict
resolution in their homelands, there have not been serious attempts
intellectually or institutionally to focus on how diasporas could be
21 1
Part of the
included in the process of constitutional settlement.
reason for this neglect is the assumption that diasporas are outside
the country and, therefore, do not constitute part of the people of the
territorial state. Put simply, they are not stakeholders who should
play a formal role in the establishment of the basic documents and
institutions that are meant to resolve the differences among all the
stakeholders.

See SHAIN, supra note 10, at 101-26 (' The diaspora's role in homeland
207.
conflict perpetuation and conflict resolution can be so powerful that homeland leaders
ignore diaspora preferences at their own peril."); see also Yossi Shain & Tamara
Cofman Wittes, Peace as a Three-Level Game: The Role of Diasporas in Conflict
Resolution, in ETHNIC IDENTITY GROUPS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 169, 173 (Thomas
Ambrosio ed., 2002) (citing as an example of the military fundraising of the Eritrean
and Ethiopian diaspora during the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War.).
See Laguerre, supra note 55, at 207 (describing the role of the Hatian
208.
diaspora, especially those living in the United States, in organizing coups). See
generally Bogdanich & Nordberg, supra note 126 (describing the 2008 Haitian
rebellion).
The Tamil diaspora living in Canada and Europe provided substantial
209.
resources that sustained the armed struggle for a separate Tamil state in the north
and northeastern part of war-torn Sri Lanka for many years. Paul Collier & Anke
Hoeffler, The Political Economy of Secession, in NEGOTIATING SELF-DETERMINATION
37, 52 (Hurst Hannum & Eileen F. Babbitt, eds. 2006) ("The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) secessionist movement in Sri Lanka is financed in part from Canada; for
example, the 1996 bomb that killed 86 civilians and injured a further 1,400 in Colombo
was mainly financed by the Tamil diaspora in Canada."). Serb, Croat, and Muslim
members of the diaspora from the former Yugoslavia contributed greatly to supporting
their respective groups in the war that broke out in the former Yugoslavia. See HAken
Wiberg, Diasporasand Conflict, in THE ROLE OF DIASPORAs IN PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 37, 45 (Ulf Johanssen Dahre ed., 2007).

Collier & Hoeffler, supranote 209, at 51 ("There are various ways in which
210.
a diaspora might revive conflict. The two most obvious routes are to continue to
publicize grievances and/or to finance violent organizations.").
See Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, The Potential of Diasporasand Development,
211.
in DIASPORAs AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 1 (Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff ed., 2008)
("Governments, international organizations, and donors increasingly recognize
diasporas as important actors in peace and conflict and development, but policymakers
have few, if any, guidelines or formal policies on how best to incorporate diasporas into
peace and development strategies.").
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This Article has argued that diasporas are indeed stakeholders,
and hence are part of the people. To reiterate, members of diasporas
are stakeholders in a number of ways. First, their identities are often
tied to the identity of the homeland, so that decisions by home
governments often affect how members of the diaspora view
themselves and how the people in the host state view them. The
flourishing of the homeland is seen as the precondition for the
cultural flourishing of the diaspora-the cultural stake. Second, in the
case of many developing countries of the south, members .of their
diasporas living in the developed north have assumed, by necessity,
increasingly large financial burdens because they have family
members who continue to depend on them. Therefore, decisions by
the homeland government on economic matters significantly affect a
large number of the members of the diaspora-the economic stake.
Third, many members of the diaspora were forced to leave the
homeland because of oppressive political conditions. The governments
of those countries often discourage, or even prohibit, internal
oppositions and challenges. Under those circumstances, members of
the diaspora assume the role of the opposition, determined to put
pressure on the government of the homeland (either through lobbying
the host government or through organizing political parties, or even
paramilitary forces) so as to reform the political process that
continues to deny their relatives' political freedoms, coethnics'
political freedoms, or both-the political stake. Members of diasporas
are therefore stakeholders culturally, economically, and politically,
and thus have a deep interest in the nature of a constitutional
settlement in their war-torn homelands because that settlement
would end up shaping the character of the community that emerges
from it.
Beyond reasons of stakeholding, even on a purely pragmatic
level, it seems rather straightforward that a group that has had an
enormous role in conflict perpetuation-from South Asia to the Horn
of Africa, from Central America to the Middle East, from the Balkans
to the Iberian Peninsula-would be considered a legitimate (and even
a key) participant in the process of conflict resolution and
constitutional settlement. The reason why some diasporas play
crucial roles, both in terms of conflict perpetuation and conflict
resolution, is because they "provide a great deal of financial support
[and) because they frame the conflicts through their control over
media outlets (that reach the homeland] and other institutions and
venues where political strategies are debated and leadership
legitimized. '212 And in the age of the communication revolution and
globalization, the availability and use of financial and communication
resources to perpetuate conflicts is only going to increase. It makes

212.

Lyons, supra note 72, at 123.
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sense to find ways to marshal these resources for the purpose of
conflict resolution.
The manner in which diasporas are included in the process of
constitutional settlement will, of course, depend on the nature of the
conflict in the homeland. 213 Some conflicts may allow for a united
diaspora, such as conflicts between the homeland and another
country or when the internal divisions are simply between
unaccountable governmental authorities and a dispossessed
homeland population. Others-such as ethnic-based conflicts-may
reproduce the division at home within the diaspora. Under those
conditions, diasporic representation may call for a nonunitary or a
loosely federated representation. But the important thing is to realize
that taking the interests of the diaspora into account will often lead
to stable and enduring constitutional settlements.
It is reasonable to assume that because the homeland is "a
special category of territory, laden with symbolic meaning for those
who identify with it from afar" and because the daily costs of conflict
may not affect diasporas to the same degree as those within the
territory of the homeland, diasporas may be "less likely to support
compromise or a bargain that trades off some portion of the sacred
homeland [or an important cultural heritage] for some other
instrumental end. '214 But it would be a terrible mistake to think that
the lesson to be drawn from that is, therefore, that diasporas ought
never be a part of the process of settlement. Indeed, the opposite is
true. In some circumstances, because of financial and other powers of
the diaspora, their exclusion is likely to make a tough situation
virtually impossible. Excluded diasporas are likely to put enormous
pressure-financial or otherwise-on negotiators within the
215
homeland, or they may start funding alternative, spoiler groups.

VII.

CONCLUSION: "OUTSIDE THE STATE BUT INSIDE THE
PEOPLE": THE DIASPORA AS THE BRIDGE BETWEEN

THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL

Yossi Shain aptly described diasporas as being "outside the state
but inside the people. '2 16 Three things are implied by this description.
First, the territorial state does not exhaust the venues within which

213.
See Wiberg, supra note 209, at 44 ("How diasporas are created and what
positions they take depends, among other things, on the nature of the conflict that may
have contributed to creating them.").
Lyons, supra note 72, at 116.
214.
See generally CHALLENGES TO PEACEBUILDING: MANAGING SPOILERS
215.
DURING CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond eds., 2006)

(discussing challenges to peace building from spoiler groups).
SHAIN, supranote 10, at 124 (emphasis omitted).
216.
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people organize themselves as communities of character. This will
increasingly be the case as globalization intensifies and people
continue to be members of multiple and overlapping communities,
often across territorial boundaries. In this sense, the diasporahomeland relationship exemplifies the transnational movement and
points to the cosmopolitan world that is increasingly a reality.
Second, and as a qualifier to the first point, the diaspora-homeland
relationship indicates that to take hold and to last, cosmopolitan
sentiments must be worked out in the context of common sympathy
and commitments. The diaspora-homeland relationship provides one
example of how to begin bridging two aspects of people's existence in
this globalized world: national attachments and cosmopolitan
sentiments. It offers one point of departure to understanding the
formation and transformation of communities across territorial
borders, as well as how legal obligations and allegiances develop and
are altered. The position of diasporas described in this Article has
affinity with what Kwame Anthony Appiah has called "rooted
cosmopolitanism,"2 1 7 the proposition that a defensible and successful
cosmopolitanism would have to acknowledge and start with the
reality of "at least some form of partiality. 2 18 The diasporahomeland relationship offers an example of that.
Third, Shain's description speaks to the necessity of developing
the appropriate legal and political language to capture these
overlapping and quasi-transnational communities and affiliations.
Developed in the context of the binary of the territorial state
(territorial nationalism) and the (undifferentiated) international
community, current political and legal language is not adequate to
describe fully the various ways in which communities and peoples
develop and are transformed.
The purpose of this Article has been to develop the appropriate
political and legal language to capture these intermediate
communities and to suggest what institutional structures will sustain
them and enhance their effectiveness. "Effectiveness" refers not just
to the quality and depth of the communities that are cultivated, but
also to whether and how these communities comply with the
democratic norm that the governing rules should be the rules of the
ruled. No one group (such as the diaspora) should enjoy the role of a
choice-maker unless it is also a choice-taker, subject to the
consequences of those choices, whether good or bad. The theory of
peoplehood this Article advances, which takes the principle of affected

217.

See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 213, 256-59 (2005)

(explaining the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism).
218.
Id. at 223 ("A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile a kind of
universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of partiality.").
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interests as its guide, would require that diasporas should only be
able to influence decisions about the homeland that affect them.

